ACCA2019-2020MA（F2）考试大纲，速看！

正确答案：

正确答案：
(b) Increased information disclosure benefits users by reducing the likelihood that they will misallocate their capital. This is
obviously a direct benefit to individual users of corporate reports. The disclosure reduces the risk of misallocation of capital
by enabling users to improve their assessments of a company’s prospects. This creates three important results.
(i) Users use information disclosed to increase their investment returns and by definition support the most profitable
companies which are likely to be those that contribute most to economic growth. Thus, an important benefit of
information disclosure is that it improves the effectiveness of the investment process.
(ii) The second result lies in the effect on the liquidity of the capital markets. A more liquid market assists the effective
allocation of capital by allowing users to reallocate their capital quickly. The degree of information asymmetry between
the buyer and seller and the degree of uncertainty of the buyer and the seller will affect the liquidity of the market as
lower asymmetry and less uncertainty will increase the number of transactions and make the market more liquid.
Disclosure will affect uncertainty and information asymmetry.
(iii) Information disclosure helps users understand the risk of a prospective investment. Without any information, the user
has no way of assessing a company’s prospects. Information disclosure helps investors predict a company’s prospects.
Getting a better understanding of the true risk could lower the price of capital for the company. It is difficult to prove
however that the average cost of capital is lowered by information disclosure, even though it is logically and practically
impossible to assess a company’s risk without relevant information. Lower capital costs promote investment, which can
stimulate productivity and economic growth.
However although increased information can benefit users, there are problems of understandability and information overload.
Information disclosure provides a degree of protection to users. The benefit is fairness to users and is part of corporate
accountability to society as a whole.
The main costs to the preparer of financial statements are as follows:
(i) the cost of developing and disseminating information,
(ii) the cost of possible litigation attributable to information disclosure,
(iii) the cost of competitive disadvantage attributable to disclosure.
The costs of developing and disseminating the information include those of gathering, creating and auditing the information.
Additional costs to the preparers include training costs, changes to systems (for example on moving to IFRS), and the more
complex and the greater the information provided, the more it will cost the company.
Although litigation costs are known to arise from information disclosure, it does not follow that all information disclosure leads
to litigation costs. Cases can arise from insufficient disclosure and misleading disclosure. Only the latter is normally prompted
by the presentation of information disclosure. Fuller disclosure could lead to lower costs of litigation as the stock market would
have more realistic expectations of the company’s prospects and the discrepancy between the valuation implicit in the market
price and the valuation based on a company’s financial statements would be lower. However, litigation costs do not
necessarily increase with the extent of the disclosure. Increased disclosure could reduce litigation costs.
Disclosure could weaken a company’s ability to generate future cash flows by aiding its competitors. The effect of disclosure
on competitiveness involves benefits as well as costs. Competitive disadvantage could be created if disclosure is made relating
to strategies, plans, (for example, planned product development, new market targeting) or information about operations (for
example, production-cost figures). There is a significant difference between the purpose of disclosure to users and
competitors. The purpose of disclosure to users is to help them to estimate the amount, timing, and certainty of future cash
flows. Competitors are not trying to predict a company’s future cash flows, and information of use in that context is not
necessarily of use in obtaining competitive advantage. Overlap between information designed to meet users’ needs and
information designed to further the purposes of a competitor is often coincidental. Every company that could suffer competitive
disadvantage from disclosure could gain competitive advantage from comparable disclosure by competitors. Published figures
are often aggregated with little use to competitors.
Companies bargain with suppliers and with customers, and information disclosure could give those parties an advantage in
negotiations. In such cases, the advantage would be a cost for the disclosing entity. However, the cost would be offset
whenever information disclosure was presented by both parties, each would receive an advantage and a disadvantage.
There are other criteria to consider such as whether the information to be disclosed is about the company. This is both a
benefit and a cost criterion. Users of corporate reports need company-specific data, and it is typically more costly to obtain
and present information about matters external to the company. Additionally, consideration must be given as to whether the
company is the best source for the information. It could be inefficient for a company to obtain or develop data that other, more
expert parties could develop and present or do develop at present.
There are many benefits to information disclosure and users have unmet information needs. It cannot be known with any
certainty what the optimal disclosure level is for companies. Some companies through voluntary disclosure may have
achieved their optimal level. There are no quantitative measures of how levels of disclosure stand with respect to optimal
levels. Standard setters have to make such estimates as best they can, guided by prudence, and by what evidence of benefits
and costs they can obtain.

正确答案：
6 CERTAIN PRACTICES
Tutorial note: The answer which follows is indicative of the range of points which might be made. Other relevant material will
be given suitable credit.
(a) ‘Lowballing’
Explanation of term
‘Lowballing’ is the ‘loss-leading’ practice in which auditors compete for clients by reducing their fees for statutory audits.
Lower audit fees are then compensated by the auditor carrying out more lucrative non-audit work (e.g. consultancy and tax
advice). Audits may even be offered for free.
Such ‘predatory pricing’ may undercut an incumbent auditor to secure an appointment into which higher price consultancy
services may be sold.
Ethical risks
There is a risk of incompetence if the non-audit work does not materialise and the lowballing firm comes under pressure to
cut corners or resort to irregular practices (e.g. the falsification of audit working papers) in order to ‘keep within budget’.
However, a lack of audit quality may only be discovered if the situation arises that the company collapses and the auditors
are charged with negligence.
If, rather than comprise the quality of the audit, an audit firm substantially increases audit fees, a fee dispute could arise. In
this case the client might refuse to pay the higher fee. It could be difficult then for the firm to take the matter to arbitration
if the client was misled. Thus an advocacy threat may arise.
Financial dependence is a direct incentive that threatens independence. A self-interest threat therefore arises when, having
secured the audit, the audit firm needs the client to retain its services in order to recoup any losses initially incurred.
The provision of many other services gives rise to a self-review threat (as well as a self-interest threat).
Sufficiency of current ethical guidance
In current ethical guidance, the fact that an accountancy firm quotes a lower fee than other tendering firms is not improper,
providing that the prospective client is not misled about:
– the precise range of services that the quoted fee is intended to cover; and
– the likely level of fees for any other work undertaken.
This is clearly insufficient to prevent the practice of lowballing.
Legal prohibitions on the provision of many non-audit services (e.g. bookkeeping, financial information systems design and
implementation, valuation services, actuarial services, internal audit (outsourced), human resource services for executive
positions, investment and legal services) should make lowballing a riskier pricing strategy. This may curb the tendency to
lowball.
Lowballing could be eliminated if, for example, auditors were required to act ‘exclusively as auditors’. Although regulatory
environments have moved towards this there is not a total prohibition on non-audit services.