ACCAF1考试-会计师与企业（基础阶段）章节练习(2020-10-10)

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However, an exemption from corporation tax exists for any gain arising when a trading company (or member of a trading
group) sells the whole or any part of a substantial shareholding in another trading company.
A substantial shareholding is one where the investing company holds 10% of the ordinary share capital and is beneficially
entitled to at least 10% of the
(i) profits available for distribution to equity holders and
(ii) assets of the company available for distribution to equity holders on a winding up.
In meeting the 10% test, shares owned by a chargeable gains group may be amalgamated. The 10% test must have been
met for a continuous 12 month period during the 2 years preceding the disposal.
The companies making the disposals must have been trading companies (or members of a trading group) throughout the
12 month period, as well as at the date of disposal. In addition, they must also be trading companies (or members of a trading
group) immediately after the disposal.
The exemption is given automatically, and acts to deny losses as well as eliminate gains.
While Alantech Ltd has owned its holding in Mobile Ltd for 33 months, its ownership of the Boron holding has only lasted
for 10 months (at 1 June 2005) since Boron was acquired on 1 July 2004. Selling the shares in June 2005 will fail the
12 month test, and the gain will become chargeable.
It would be better for the companies to wait for a further month until July 2005 before selling the amalgamated shareholding.
By doing so, they will both be able to take advantage of the substantial shareholdings relief, thereby saving tax of ￡29,625
assuming a corporation tax rate of 19%.

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Tutorial note:
In order to apply any piece of legislation, judges have to determine its meaning. In other words they are required to interpret the
statute before them in order to give it meaning. The diffi culty, however, is that the words in statutes do not speak for themselves and
interpretation is an active process, and at least potentially a subjective one depending on the situation of the person who is doing
the interpreting.
Judges have considerable power in deciding the actual meaning of statutes, especially when they are able to deploy a number of
competing, not to say contradictory, mechanisms for deciding the meaning of the statute before them. There are, essentially, two
contrasting views as to how judges should go about determining the meaning of a statute – the restrictive, literal approach and the
more permissive, purposive approach.
(a) The literal approach
The literal approach is dominant in the English legal system, although it is not without critics, and devices do exist for
circumventing it when it is seen as too restrictive. This view of judicial interpretation holds that the judge should look primarily
to the words of the legislation in order to construe its meaning and, except in the very limited circumstances considered below,
should not look outside of, or behind, the legislation in an attempt to fi nd its meaning.
Within the context of the literal approach there are two distinct rules:
(i) The literal rule
Under this rule, the judge is required to consider what the legislation actually says rather than considering what it might
mean. In order to achieve this end, the judge should give words in legislation their literal meaning, that is, their plain,
ordinary, everyday meaning, even if the effect of this is to produce what might be considered an otherwise unjust or
undesirable outcome (Fisher v Bell (1961)) in which the court chose to follow the contract law literal interpretation of
the meaning of offer in the Act in question and declined to consider the usual non-legal literal interpretation of the word
(offer).

(ii) The golden rule
This rule is applied in circumstances where the application of the literal rule is likely to result in what appears to the court
to be an obviously absurd result. It should be emphasised, however, that the court is not at liberty to ignore, or replace,
legislative provisions simply on the basis that it considers them absurd; it must fi nd genuine diffi culties before it declines
to use the literal rule in favour of the golden one. As examples, there may be two apparently contradictory meanings to a
particular word used in the statute, or the provision may simply be ambiguous in its effect. In such situations, the golden
rule operates to ensure that preference is given to the meaning that does not result in the provision being an absurdity.
Thus in Adler v George (1964) the defendant was found guilty, under the Offi cial Secrets Act 1920, with obstruction
‘in the vicinity’ of a prohibited area, although she had actually carried out the obstruction ‘inside’ the area.
(b) The purposive approach
The purposive approach rejects the limitation of the judges’ search for meaning to a literal construction of the words of
legislation itself. It suggests that the interpretative role of the judge should include, where necessary, the power to look beyond
the words of statute in pursuit of the reason for its enactment, and that meaning should be construed in the light of that purpose
and so as to give it effect. This purposive approach is typical of civil law systems. In these jurisdictions, legislation tends to set
out general principles and leaves the fi ne details to be fi lled in later by the judges who are expected to make decisions in the
furtherance of those general principles.
European Community (EC) legislation tends to be drafted in the continental manner. Its detailed effect, therefore, can only be
determined on the basis of a purposive approach to its interpretation. This requirement, however, runs counter to the literal
approach that is the dominant approach in the English system. The need to interpret such legislation, however, has forced
a change in that approach in relation to Community legislation and even with respect to domestic legislation designed to
implement Community legislation. Thus, in Pickstone v Freemans plc (1988), the House of Lords held that it was permissible,
and indeed necessary, for the court to read words into inadequate domestic legislation in order to give effect to Community
law in relation to provisions relating to equal pay for work of equal value. (For a similar approach, see also the House of Lords’
decision in Litster v Forth Dry Dock (1989) and the decision in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 2) (1996).) However,
it has to recognise that the purposive rule is not particularly modern and has its precursor in a long established rule of statutory
interpretation, namely the mischief rule.

The mischief rule
This rule permits the court to go behind the actual wording of a statute in order to consider the problem that the statute is
supposed to remedy.
In its traditional expression it is limited by being restricted to using previous common law rules in order to decide the operation
of contemporary legislation. Thus in Heydon’s case (1584) it was stated that in making use of the mischief rule the court
should consider what the mischief in the law was which the common law did not adequately deal with and which statute law
had intervened to remedy. Use of the mischief rule may be seen in Corkery v Carpenter (1950), in which a man was found
guilty of being drunk in charge of a carriage although he was in fact only in charge of a bicycle.

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(b) Principal audit work – useful life of rig platforms
Tutorial notes: The platforms are just one item of each rig. Candidates should not be awarded marks here for the matters
to be considered in the assessment of useful lives (since this is illustrated in the scenario). No marks will be awarded for
criticising management for estimating useful lives on a per platform. basis or for audit work on depreciation charges/carrying
amounts unrelated to the determination of useful lives.
■ Review of management’s annual assessment of the useful life of each rig at 31 December 2005 and corroboration of
any information that has led to a change in previous estimates. For example, for the abandoned rig, where useful life
has been assessed to be at an end, obtain:
? weather reports;
? incident report supported by photographs;
? insurance claim, etc.
■ Consider management’s past experience and expertise in estimating useful lives. For example, if all lives initially
assessed as short (c. 15 years) are subsequently lengthened (or long lives consistently shortened) this would suggest
that management is being over (under) prudent in its initial estimates.
■ Review of industry comparatives as published in the annual reports of other oil producers.
■ Comparison of actual maintenance costs against budgeted to confirm that the investment needed in maintenance, to
achieve expected life expectancy, is being made.
■ Comparison of actual output (oil extracted) against budgeted. If actual output is less than budgeted the economic life
of the platform. may be:
? shorter (e.g. because there is less oil to be extracted than originally surveyed); or
? longer (e.g. because the rate of extraction is less than budgeted).
Tutorial note: An increase in actual output can be explained conversely.
■ A review of the results of management’s impairment testing of each rig (i.e. the cash-generating unit of which each
platform. is a part).
■ Recalculations of cash flow projections (based on reasonable and supportable assumptions) discounted at a suitable
pre-tax rate.
Tutorial note: As the rigs will not have readily determinable net selling prices (each one being unique and not available
for sale) any impairment will be assessed by a comparison of value in use against carrying amount.
■ Review of working papers of geologist/quantity surveyor(s) employed by Shire supporting estimations of reserves used
in the determination of useful lives of rigs.