ACCA考试F1-F6的考试分别是关于什么的呢...
发布时间:2021-03-12
ACCA考试F1-F6的考试分别是关于什么的呢?
最佳答案
考试内容:
F1会计师与企业AccountantinBusiness(AB)
F2管理会计ManagementAccounting(MA)F3财务会计FinancialAccounting(FA)
F4公司法与商法CorporateandBusinessLaw(CL)
F5业绩管理PerformanceManagement(PM)
F6税务Taxation(TX)
下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。
(ii) Compute the annual income tax saving from your recommendation in (i) above as compared with the
situation where Cindy retains both the property and the shares. Identify any other tax implications
arising from your recommendation. Your answer should consider all relevant taxes. (3 marks)
This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.
Phase 1 (1965–1988)
In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of
rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.
Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.
However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.
Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.
Phase 2 (1989–2002)
In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and
civil liberties.
Phase 3 (2003–2008)
In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.
Required:
(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the
scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.
(18 marks)
(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.
Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have
made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)
(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.
In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.
(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.
2 Clifford and Amanda, currently aged 54 and 45 respectively, were married on 1 February 1998. Clifford is a higher
rate taxpayer who has realised taxable capital gains in 2007/08 in excess of his capital gains tax annual exemption.
Clifford moved into Amanda’s house in London on the day they were married. Clifford’s own house in Oxford, where
he had lived since acquiring it for £129,400 on 1 August 1996, has been empty since that date although he and
Amanda have used it when visiting friends. Clifford has been offered £284,950 for the Oxford house and has decided
that it is time to sell it. The house has a large garden such that Clifford is also considering an offer for the house and
a part only of the garden. He would then sell the remainder of the garden at a later date as a building plot. His total
sales proceeds will be higher if he sells the property in this way.
Amanda received the following income from quoted investments in 2006/07:
£
Dividends in respect of quoted trading company shares 1,395
Dividends paid by a Real Estate Investment Trust out of tax exempt property income 485
On 1 May 2006, Amanda was granted a 22 year lease of a commercial investment property. She paid the landlord
a premium of £6,900 and also pays rent of £2,100 per month. On 1 June 2006 Amanda granted a nine year
sub-lease of the property. She received a premium of £14,700 and receives rent of £2,100 per month.
On 1 September 2006 Amanda gave quoted shares with a value of £2,200 to a registered charity. She paid broker’s
fees of £115 in respect of the gift.
Amanda began working for Shearer plc, a quoted company, on 1 June 2006 having had a two year break from her
career. She earns an annual salary of £38,600 and was paid a bonus of £5,750 in August 2006 for agreeing to
come and work for the company. On 1 August 2006 Amanda was provided with a fully expensed company car,
including the provision of private petrol, which had a list price when new of £23,400 and a CO2 emissions rate of
187 grams per kilometre. Amanda is required to pay Shearer plc £22 per month in respect of the private use of the
car. In June and July 2006 Amanda used her own car whilst on company business. She drove 720 business miles
during this two month period and was paid 34 pence per mile. Amanda had PAYE of £6,785 deducted from her gross
salary in the tax year 2006/07.
After working for Shearer plc for a full year, Amanda becomes entitled to the following additional benefits:
– The opportunity to purchase a large number of shares in Shearer plc on 1 July 2007 for £3·30 per share. It is
anticipated that the share price on that day will be at least £7·50 per share. The company will make an interestfree
loan to Amanda equal to the cost of the shares to be repaid in two years.
– Exclusive free use of the company sailing boat for one week in August 2007. The sailing boat was purchased by
Shearer plc in January 2005 for use by its senior employees and costs the company £1,400 a week in respect
of its crew and other running expenses.
Required:
(a) (i) Calculate Clifford’s capital gains tax liability for the tax year 2007/08 on the assumption that the Oxford
house together with its entire garden is sold on 31 July 2007 for £284,950. Comment on the relevance
to your calculations of the size of the garden; (5 marks)
1 Your client, Island Co, is a manufacturer of machinery used in the coal extraction industry. You are currently planning
the audit of the financial statements for the year ended 30 November 2007. The draft financial statements show
revenue of $125 million (2006 – $103 million), profit before tax of $5·6 million (2006 – $5·1 million) and total
assets of $95 million (2006 – $90 million). Your firm was appointed as auditor to Island Co for the first time in June
2007.
Island Co designs, constructs and installs machinery for five key customers. Payment is due in three instalments: 50%
is due when the order is confirmed (stage one), 25% on delivery of the machinery (stage two), and 25% on successful
installation in the customer’s coal mine (stage three). Generally it takes six months from the order being finalised until
the final installation.
At 30 November, there is an amount outstanding of $2·85 million from Jacks Mine Co. The amount is a disputed
stage three payment. Jacks Mine Co is refusing to pay until the machinery, which was installed in August 2007, is
running at 100% efficiency.
One customer, Sawyer Co, communicated in November 2007, via its lawyers with Island Co, claiming damages for
injuries suffered by a drilling machine operator whose arm was severely injured when a machine malfunctioned. Kate
Shannon, the chief executive officer of Island Co, has told you that the claim is being ignored as it is generally known
that Sawyer Co has a poor health and safety record, and thus the accident was their fault. Two orders which were
placed by Sawyer Co in October 2007 have been cancelled.
Work in progress is valued at $8·5 million at 30 November 2007. A physical inventory count was held on
17 November 2007. The chief engineer estimated the stage of completion of each machine at that date. One of the
major components included in the coal extracting machinery is now being sourced from overseas. The new supplier,
Locke Co, is located in Spain and invoices Island Co in euros. There is a trade payable of $1·5 million owing to Locke
Co recorded within current liabilities.
All machines are supplied carrying a one year warranty. A warranty provision is recognised on the balance sheet at
$2·5 million (2006 – $2·4 million). Kate Shannon estimates the cost of repairing defective machinery reported by
customers, and this estimate forms the basis of the provision.
Kate Shannon owns 60% of the shares in Island Co. She also owns 55% of Pacific Co, which leases a head office to
Island Co. Kate is considering selling some of her shares in Island Co in late January 2008, and would like the audit
to be finished by that time.
Required:
(a) Using the information provided, identify and explain the principal audit risks, and any other matters to be
considered when planning the final audit for Island Co for the year ended 30 November 2007.
Note: your answer should be presented in the format of briefing notes to be used at a planning meeting.
Requirement (a) includes 2 professional marks. (13 marks)
1 ISLAND CO
(a) Briefing Notes
Subject: Principal Audit Risks – Island Co
Revenue Recognition – timing
Island Co raises sales invoices in three stages. There is potential for breach of IAS 18 Revenue, which states that revenue
should only be recognised once the seller has the right to receive it, in other words the seller has performed its contractual
obligations. This right does not necessarily correspond to amounts falling due for payment in accordance with an invoice
schedule agreed with a customer as part of a contract. Island Co appears to receive payment from its customers in advance
of performing any obligation, as the stage one invoice is raised when an order is confirmed i.e. before any work has actually
taken place. This creates the potential for revenue to be recognised too early, in advance of any performance of contractual
obligation. When a payment is received in advance of performance, a liability should be recognised equal to the amount
received, representing the obligation under the contract. Therefore a significant risk is that revenue is overstated and liabilities
understated.
Tutorial note: Equivalent guidance is also provided in IAS 11 Construction Contracts and credit will be awarded where
candidates discuss revenue recognition under IAS 11 as Island Co is providing a single substantial asset for a customer
under the terms of a contract.
Disputed receivable
The amount owed from Jacks Mine Co is highly material as it represents 50·9% of profit before tax, 2·3% of revenue, and
3% of total assets. The risk is that the receivable is overstated if no impairment of the disputed receivable is recognised.
Legal claim
The claim should be investigated seriously by Island Co. The chief executive officer’s (CEO) opinion that the claim will not
result in any financial consequence for Island Co is na?ve and flippant. Damages could be awarded against Island Co if it is
found that the machinery is faulty. The recurring high level of warranty provision implies that machinery faults are fairly
common and therefore the accident could be the result of a defective machine being supplied to Sawyer Co. The risk is that
no provision is created for the potential damages under IAS 37 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets, if the
likelihood of paying damages is considered probable. Alternatively, if the likelihood of damages being paid to Sawyer Co is
considered a possibility then a disclosure note should be made in the financial statements describing the nature and possible
financial effect of the contingent liability. As discussed below, the CEO, Kate Shannon, has an incentive not to make a
provision or disclose a contingent liability due to the planned share sale post year end.
A further risk is that any legal fees associated with the claim have not been accrued within the financial statements. As the
claim has arisen during the year, the expense must be included in this year’s income statement, even if the claim is still ongoing
at the year end.
The fact that the legal claim is effectively being ignored may cast doubts on the overall integrity of senior management, and
on the integrity of the financial statements. Management representations should be approached with a degree of professional
scepticism during the audit.
Sawyer Co has cancelled two orders. If the amounts are still outstanding at the year end then it is highly likely that Sawyer
Co will not pay the invoiced amounts, and thus receivables are overstated. If the stage one payments have already been made,
then Sawyer Co may claim a refund, in which case a provision should be made to repay the amount, or a contingent liability
disclosed in a note to the financial statements.
Sawyer Co is one of only five major customers, and losing this customer could have future going concern implications for
Island Co if a new source of revenue cannot be found to replace the lost income stream from Sawyer Co. If the legal claim
becomes public knowledge, and if Island Co is found to have supplied faulty machinery, then it will be difficult to attract new
customers.
A case of this nature could bring bad publicity to Island Co, a potential going concern issue if it results in any of the five key
customers terminating orders with Island Co. The auditors should plan to extend the going concern work programme to
incorporate the issues noted above.
Inventories
Work in progress is material to the financial statements, representing 8·9% of total assets. The inventory count was held two
weeks prior to the year end. There is an inherent risk that the valuation has not been correctly rolled forward to a year end
position.
The key risk is the estimation of the stage of completion of work in progress. This is subjective, and knowledge appears to
be confined to the chief engineer. Inventory could be overvalued if the machines are assessed to be more complete than they
actually are at the year end. Absorption of labour costs and overheads into each machine is a complex calculation and must
be done consistently with previous years.
It will also be important that consumable inventories not yet utilised on a machine, e.g. screws, nuts and bolts, are correctly
valued and included as inventories of raw materials within current assets.
Overseas supplier
As the supplier is new, controls may not yet have been established over the recording of foreign currency transactions.
Inherent risk is high as the trade payable should be retranslated using the year end exchange rate per IAS 21 The Effects of
Changes in Foreign Exchange Rates. If the retranslation is not performed at the year end, the trade payable could be
significantly over or under valued, depending on the movement of the dollar to euro exchange rate between the purchase date
and the year end. The components should remain at historic cost within inventory valuation and should not be retranslated
at the year end.
Warranty provision
The warranty provision is material at 2·6% of total assets (2006 – 2·7%). The provision has increased by only $100,000,
an increase of 4·2%, compared to a revenue increase of 21·4%. This could indicate an underprovision as the percentage
change in revenue would be expected to be in line with the percentage change in the warranty provision, unless significant
improvements had been made to the quality of machines installed for customers during the year. This appears unlikely given
the legal claim by Sawyer Co, and the machines installed at Jacks Mine Co operating inefficiently. The basis of the estimate
could be understated to avoid charging the increase in the provision as an expense through the income statement. This is of
special concern given that it is the CEO and majority shareholder who estimates the warranty provision.
Majority shareholder
Kate Shannon exerts control over Island Co via a majority shareholding, and by holding the position of CEO. This greatly
increases the inherent risk that the financial statements could be deliberately misstated, i.e. overvaluation of assets,
undervaluation of liabilities, and thus overstatement of profits. The risk is severe at this year end as Kate Shannon is hoping
to sell some Island Co shares post year end. As the price that she receives for these shares will be to a large extent influenced
by the balance sheet position of the company at 30 November 2007, she has a definite interest in manipulating the financial
statements for her own personal benefit. For example:
– Not recognising a provision or contingent liability for the legal claim from Sawyer Co
– Not providing for the potentially irrecoverable receivable from Jacks Mines Co
– Not increasing the warranty provision
– Recognising revenue earlier than permitted by IAS 18 Revenue.
Related party transactions
Kate Shannon controls Island Co and also controls Pacific Co. Transactions between the two companies should be disclosed
per IAS 24 Related Party Disclosures. There is risk that not all transactions have been disclosed, or that a transaction has
been disclosed at an inappropriate value. Details of the lease contract between the two companies should be disclosed within
a note to the financial statements, in particular, any amounts owed from Island Co to Pacific Co at 30 November 2007 should
be disclosed.
Other issues
– Kate Shannon wants the audit to be completed as soon as possible, which brings forward the deadline for completion
of the audit. The audit team may not have time to complete all necessary procedures, or there may not be time for
adequate reviews to be carried out on the work performed. Detection risk, and thus audit risk is increased, and the
overall quality of the audit could be jeopardised.
– This is especially important given that this is the first year audit and therefore the audit team will be working with a
steep learning curve. Audit procedures may take longer than originally planned, yet there is little time to extend
procedures where necessary.
– Kate Shannon may also exert considerable influence on the members of the audit team to ensure that the financial
statements show the best possible position of Island Co in view of her share sale. It is crucial that the audit team
members adhere strictly to ethical guidelines and that independence is beyond question.
– Due to the seriousness of the matters noted above, a final matter to be considered at the planning stage is that a second
partner review (Engagement Quality Control Review) should be considered for the audit this year end. A suitable
independent reviewer should be indentified, and time planned and budgeted for at the end of the assignment.
Conclusion
From the range of issues discussed in these briefing notes, it can be seen that the audit of Island Co will be a relatively high
risk engagement.
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