看看有你所在的福建省有上榜吗——ACCA中国考点分布城市

正确答案：
(d) It is not possible to combine the reserves as suggested. IAS1 Presentation of financial statements requires retained earnings
to be shown seperately from other reserves.

正确答案：
(c) Principal audit work
(i) Development expenditure on the Fox model
■ Agree opening balance, $6·3 million, to prior year working papers.
■ Physically inspect assembly plant/factory where the Fox is being developed and any vehicles so far manufactured
(e.g. for testing).
■ Substantiate costs incurred during the year, for example:
– goods (e.g. components) and services (e.g. consultants) to purchase invoices;
– labour (e.g. design engineers/technicians, mechanics, test drivers) to the payroll analysis;
– overheads (e.g. depreciation of development buildings and equipment, power, consumables) to
management’s calculation of overhead absorption and underlying cost accounts.
■ Review of internal trials/test drive results (e.g. in reports to management and video recordings of events).
■ Reperform. management’s impairment test of development expenditure. In particular recalculate value in use.
Tutorial note: It is highly unlikely that a reasonable estimate of fair value less costs to sell could be made for so
unique an asset.
■ Substantiate the key assumptions made by management in calculating value in use. For example:
– the level of sales expected when the car is launched to advance orders (this may have fallen with the delay
in the launch);
– the discount rate used to Pavia’s cost of capital;
– projected growth in sales to actual sales growth seen last time a new model was launched.

正确答案：A

Where there is a significant change in ownership of the company, ISA 210 Agreeing the Terms of Audit Engagements recommends that a new audit engagement letter is sent to avoid misunderstandings.

正确答案：
(c) Corporate governance provisions varying by country
There is a debate about the extent to which corporate governance provisions (in the form. of either written codes, laws or
general acceptances) should be global or whether they should vary to account for local differences. In this answer, Vincent
Viola’s view is critically evaluated.
In general terms, corporate governance provisions vary depending on such factors as local business culture, businesses’
capital structures, the extent of development of capital funding of businesses and the openness of stock markets. In Germany,
for example, companies have traditionally drawn much of their funding from banks thereby reducing their dependence on
shareholders’ equity. Stock markets in the Soviet Union are less open and less liquid than those in the West. In many
developing countries, business activity is concentrated among family-owned enterprises.
Against Vincent’s view
Although business cultures vary around the world, all business financed by private capital have private shareholders. Any
dilution of the robustness of provisions may ignore the needs of local investors to have their interests adequately represented.
This dilution, in turn, may allow bad practice, when present, to exist and proliferate.
Some countries suffer from a poor reputation in terms of endemic corruption and fraud and any reduction in the rigour with
which corporate governance provisions are implemented fail to address these shortcomings, notwithstanding the fact that they
might be culturally unexpected or difficult to implement.
In terms of the effects of macroeconomic systems, Vincent’s views ignore the need for sound governance systems to underpin
confidence in economic systems. This is especially important when inward investment needs are considered as the economic
wealth of affected countries are partly underpinned by the robustness, or not, of their corporate governance systems.
Supporting Vincent’s view
In favour of Vincent’s view are a number of arguments. Where local economies are driven more by small family businesses
and less by public companies, accountability relationships are quite different (perhaps the ‘family reasons’ referred to in the
case) and require a different type of accounting and governance.
There is a high compliance and monitoring cost to highly structured governance regimes that some developing countries may
deem unnecessary to incur.
There is, to some extent, a link between the stage of economic development and the adoption of formal governance codes.
It is generally accepted that developing countries need not necessarily observe the same levels of formality in governance as
more mature, developed economies.
Some countries’ governments may feel that they can use the laxity of their corporate governance regimes as a source of
international comparative advantage. In a ‘race to the bottom’, some international companies seeking to minimise the effects
of structured governance regimes on some parts of their operations may seek countries with less tight structures for some
operations.