ACCA必须在固定时间参加考试吗？来了解一下吧！

发布时间：2020-02-01

ACCA考试共有15门，我们必须考过13门才可以申请ACCA会员。很多人担心ACCA科目太多一时半会儿考不完，为此，ACCA为缩短考试周期，设置了一年四考政策，即每年设置四个考试季，可供学员灵活地参加考试。

1、  考试时间

分季机考和笔试一样，都是在3月、6月、9月及12月的考试季进行。分两种方式的考试无论是考点还是判卷标准都是一样的。目前，ACCA很多科目的考试都已开启机考通道。无论是提高考试便捷程度，还是帮助学员提高就业技能，机考都是一种颇为有益的考试形式。

2、  分季机考报名时间

分季机考和笔试一样，共分为三个报名时段，分别为早、中、晚报考时段。

什么是ACCA早、中、晚报考阶段呢？

 我们都知道ACCA考试，每年都有四次，分别在每年的3月、6月、9月和12月。这个考试周都被成为一个考试季。ACCA学员每个考季最多能够报考4门考试，毕竟每个考季仅间隔3个月的时间，同时备考4门考试对于一个正常人来已是最大限度。

当然，也有一些财务基础比较好，或者学习能力比较强的同学也许能够轻松考过四门，但即便如此，我们每个考季也只能最多报考并通过4门考试。对于大部分学员来讲，建议大家根据自己的学习时间和精力等情况酌情安排选择2-3门考试。

那么，早中晚报考阶段是否与考季相关呢？

其实，所谓的ACCA早期、中期和晚期报考阶段指的是，每个考季的ACCA考试都是需要提前进行预约报考的，ACCA官方为学员设定了三个报考时间段，在不同报考时间段内进行报考的话，那么，每科的考试费用是有所不同的。

好了，看了上面的内容，相信小伙伴对ACCA考试的相关信息有了一定的了解。如果还想了解更多信息，欢迎来51题库考试学习网留言。

下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题，供大家学习参考。

(b) While the refrigeration units were undergoing modernisation Lamont outsourced all its cold storage requirements

to Hogg Warehousing Services. At 31 March 2007 it was not possible to physically inspect Lamont’s inventory

held by Hogg due to health and safety requirements preventing unauthorised access to cold storage areas.

Lamont’s management has provided written representation that inventory held at 31 March 2007 was

$10·1 million (2006 – $6·7 million). This amount has been agreed to a costing of Hogg’s monthly return of

quantities held at 31 March 2007. (7 marks)

Required:

For each of the above issues:

(i) comment on the matters that you should consider; and

(ii) state the audit evidence that you should expect to find,

in undertaking your review of the audit working papers and financial statements of Lamont Co for the year ended

31 March 2007.

NOTE: The mark allocation is shown against each of the three issues.

正确答案：
(b) Outsourced cold storage
(i) Matters
■ Inventory at 31 March 2007 represents 21% of total assets (10·1/48·0) and is therefore a very material item in the
balance sheet.
■ The value of inventory has increased by 50% though revenue has increased by only 7·5%. Inventory may be
overvalued if no allowance has been made for slow-moving/perished items in accordance with IAS 2 Inventories.
■ Inventory turnover has fallen to 6·6 times per annum (2006 – 9·3 times). This may indicate a build up of
unsaleable items.
Tutorial note: In the absence of cost of sales information, this is calculated on revenue. It may also be expressed
as the number of days sales in inventory, having increased from 39 to 55 days.
■ Inability to inspect inventory may amount to a limitation in scope if the auditor cannot obtain sufficient audit
evidence regarding quantity and its condition. This would result in an ‘except for’ opinion.
■ Although Hogg’s monthly return provides third party documentary evidence concerning the quantity of inventory it
does not provide sufficient evidence with regard to its valuation. Inventory will need to be written down if, for
example, it was contaminated by the leakage (before being moved to Hogg’s cold storage) or defrosted during
transfer.
■ Lamont’s written representation does not provide sufficient evidence regarding the valuation of inventory as
presumably Lamont’s management did not have access to physically inspect it either. If this is the case this may
call into question the value of any other representations made by management.
■ Whether, since the balance sheet date, inventory has been moved back from Hogg’s cold storage to Lamont’s
refrigeration units. If so, a physical inspection and roll-back of the most significant fish lines should have been
undertaken.
Tutorial note: Credit will be awarded for other relevant accounting issues. For example a candidate may question
whether, for example, cold storage costs have been capitalised into the cost of inventory. Or whether inventory moves
on a FIFO basis in deep storage (rather than LIFO).
(ii) Audit evidence
■ A copy of the health and safety regulation preventing the auditor from gaining access to Hogg’s cold storage to
inspect Lamont’s inventory.
■ Analysis of Hogg’s monthly returns and agreement of significant movements to purchase/sales invoices.
■ Analytical procedures such as month-on-month comparison of gross profit percentage and inventory turnover to
identify any trend that may account for the increase in inventory valuation (e.g. if Lamont has purchased
replacement inventory but spoiled items have not been written off).
■ Physical inspection of any inventory in Lamont’s refrigeration units after the balance sheet date to confirm its
condition.
■ An aged-inventory analysis and recalculation of any allowance for slow-moving items.
■ A review of after-date sales invoices for large quantities of fish to confirm that fair value (less costs to sell) exceed
carrying amount.
■ A review of after-date credit notes for any returns of contaminated/perished or otherwise substandard fish.

11 Which of the following statements are correct?

1 A company might make a rights issue if it wished to raise more equity capital.

2 A rights issue might increase the share premium account whereas a bonus issue is likely to reduce it.

3 A bonus issue will reduce the gearing (leverage) ratio of a company.

4 A rights issue will always increase the number of shareholders in a company whereas a bonus issue will not.

A 1 and 2

B 1 and 3

C 2 and 3

D 2 and 4

正确答案：A

3 Johan, a public limited company, operates in the telecommunications industry. The industry is capital intensive with

heavy investment in licences and network infrastructure. Competition in the sector is fierce and technological

advances are a characteristic of the industry. Johan has responded to these factors by offering incentives to customers

and, in an attempt to acquire and retain them, Johan purchased a telecom licence on 1 December 2006 for

$120 million. The licence has a term of six years and cannot be used until the network assets and infrastructure are

ready for use. The related network assets and infrastructure became ready for use on 1 December 2007. Johan could

not operate in the country without the licence and is not permitted to sell the licence. Johan expects its subscriber

base to grow over the period of the licence but is disappointed with its market share for the year to 30 November

2008. The licence agreement does not deal with the renewal of the licence but there is an expectation that the

regulator will grant a single renewal for the same period of time as long as certain criteria regarding network build

quality and service quality are met. Johan has no experience of the charge that will be made by the regulator for the

renewal but other licences have been renewed at a nominal cost. The licence is currently stated at its original cost of

$120 million in the statement of financial position under non-current assets.

Johan is considering extending its network and has carried out a feasibility study during the year to 30 November

2008. The design and planning department of Johan identified five possible geographical areas for the extension of

its network. The internal costs of this study were $150,000 and the external costs were $100,000 during the year

to 30 November 2008. Following the feasibility study, Johan chose a geographical area where it was going to install

a base station for the telephone network. The location of the base station was dependent upon getting planning

permission. A further independent study has been carried out by third party consultants in an attempt to provide a

preferred location in the area, as there is a need for the optimal operation of the network in terms of signal quality

and coverage. Johan proposes to build a base station on the recommended site on which planning permission has

been obtained. The third party consultants have charged $50,000 for the study. Additionally Johan has paid

$300,000 as a single payment together with $60,000 a month to the government of the region for access to the land

upon which the base station will be situated. The contract with the government is for a period of 12 years and

commenced on 1 November 2008. There is no right of renewal of the contract and legal title to the land remains with

the government.

Johan purchases telephone handsets from a manufacturer for $200 each, and sells the handsets direct to customers

for $150 if they purchase call credit (call card) in advance on what is called a prepaid phone. The costs of selling the

handset are estimated at $1 per set. The customers using a prepaid phone pay $21 for each call card at the purchase

date. Call cards expire six months from the date of first sale. There is an average unused call credit of $3 per card

after six months and the card is activated when sold.

Johan also sells handsets to dealers for $150 and invoices the dealers for those handsets. The dealer can return the

handset up to a service contract being signed by a customer. When the customer signs a service contract, the

customer receives the handset free of charge. Johan allows the dealer a commission of $280 on the connection of a

customer and the transaction with the dealer is settled net by a payment of $130 by Johan to the dealer being the

cost of the handset to the dealer ($150) deducted from the commission ($280). The handset cannot be sold

separately by the dealer and the service contract lasts for a 12 month period. Dealers do not sell prepaid phones, and

Johan receives monthly revenue from the service contract.

The chief operating officer, a non-accountant, has asked for an explanation of the accounting principles and practices

which should be used to account for the above events.

Required:

Discuss the principles and practices which should be used in the financial year to 30 November 2008 to account

for:

(a) the licences; (8 marks)

正确答案：
Licences
An intangible asset meets the identifiability criterion when it is separable or it arises from contractual or other legal rights (IAS38
‘Intangible Assets’). Additionally intangible assets are recognised where it is probable that the future economic benefits attributable
to the asset will flow to the entity and the asset’s cost can be reliably measured. Where intangible assets are acquired separately,
the asset’s cost or fair value reflects the estimations of the future economic benefits that are expected to flow to the entity. The
licence will, therefore, meet the above criteria for recognition as an intangible asset at cost. Subsequent to initial recognition,
IAS38 permits an entity to adopt the cost or revaluation model as its accounting policy. The revaluation model can only be adopted
if intangible assets are traded in an active market. As the licence cannot be sold, the revaluation model cannot be used.
The cost model requires intangible assets to be carried at cost less amortisation and impairment losses (IAS38, para 74).
Amortisation is the systematic allocation of the depreciable amount of an intangible asset over its useful life. The depreciable
amount is the asset’s cost less its residual value. The licence will have no residual value. The depreciable amount should be
allocated on a systematic basis over its useful life. The method of amortisation should reflect the pattern in which the asset’s
economic benefits are expected to be consumed. If that pattern cannot be determined reliably, the straight line method of
amortisation must be used. The licence does not suffer wear and tear from usage, that is the number of customers using the
service. The economic benefits of the licence relate to Johan’s ability to benefit from the use of the licence. The economic benefits
relates to the passage of time and the useful life of the licence is now shorter. Therefore, the asset depletes on a time basis and
the straight line basis is appropriate. The licence should be amortised from the date that the network is available for use; that is
from 1 December 2007. An impairment review should have been undertaken at 30 November 2007 when the licence was not
being amortised. Although the licence is capable of being used on the date it was purchased, it cannot be used until the associated
network assets and infrastructure are available for use. Johan expects the regulator to renew the licence at the end of the initial
term and thus consideration should be given to amortising the licence over the two licence periods, i.e. a period of 11 years (five
years and six years) as the licence could be renewed at a nominal cost. However, Johan has no real experience of renewing licences
and cannot reliably determine what amounts, if any, would be payable to the regulator. Therefore, the licence should be amortised
over a five year period, that is $24 million per annum.
There are indications that the value of the licence may be impaired. The market share for the year to 30 November 2008 is
disappointing and competition is fierce in the sector, and retention of customers difficult. Therefore, an impairment test should be
undertaken. Johan should classify the licence and network assets as a single cash generating unit (CGU) for impairment purposes.
The licence cannot generate revenue in its own right and the smallest group of assets that generates independent revenue will be
the licence and network assets. The impairment indicators point to the need to test this cash generating unit for impairment.

This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.

Phase 1 (1965–1988)

In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of

rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.

Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.

However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.

Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.

Phase 2 (1989–2002)

In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and

civil liberties.

Phase 3 (2003–2008)

In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.

Required:

(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the

scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.

(18 marks)

(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.

Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have

made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)

正确答案：

(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.

In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.

(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.

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