快讯：如果报名ACCA机考后，能否延迟考试呢？

正确答案：
Part (b):
The difference between a person specification and a job description is that a person specification sets out the qualities of an ideal
candidate whereas a job description defines the duties and responsibilities of the job.

正确答案：

The Company Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986 was introduced to control individuals who persistently abused the various privileges that accompany incorporation, most particularly the privilege of limited liability. The Act applies to more than just directors and the court may make an order preventing any person (without leave of the court) from being:
(i) a director of a company;
(ii) a liquidator or administrator of a company;
(iii) a receiver or manager of a company’s property; or
(iv) in any way, whether directly or indirectly, concerned with or taking part in the promotion, formation or management of a company.
The CDDA 1986 identifies three distinct categories of conduct, which may, and in some circumstances must, lead the court to disqualify certain persons from being involved in the management of companies.
(a) General misconduct in connection with companies
This first category involves the following:
(i) A conviction for an indictable offence in connection with the promotion, formation, management or liquidation of a company or with the receivership or management of a company’s property (s.2 of the CDDA 1986). The maximum period for disqualification under s.2 is five years where the order is made by a court of summary jurisdiction, and 15 years in any other case.

(ii) Persistent breaches of companies legislation in relation to provisions which require any return, account or other document to be filed with, or notice of any matter to be given to, the registrar (s.3 of the CDDA 1986). Section 3 provides that a person is conclusively proved to be persistently in default where it is shown that, in the five years ending with the date of the application, he has been adjudged guilty of three or more defaults (s.3(2) of the CDDA 1986). This is without prejudice to proof of persistent default in any other manner. The maximum period of disqualification under this section is five years.
(iii) Fraud in connection with winding up (s.4 of the CDDA 1986). A court may make a disqualification order if, in the course of the winding up of a company, it appears that a person:
(1) has been guilty of an offence for which he is liable under s.993 of the CA 2006, that is, that he has knowingly been a party to the carrying on of the business of the company either with the intention of defrauding the company’s creditors or any other person or for any other fraudulent purpose; or
(2) has otherwise been guilty, while an officer or liquidator of the company or receiver or manager of the property of the company, of any fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of his duty as such officer, liquidator, receiver or manager (s.4(1)(b) of the CDDA 1986).
The maximum period of disqualification under this category is 15 years.(b) Disqualification for unfitness
The second category covers:
(i) disqualification of directors of companies which have become insolvent, who are found by the court to be unfit to be directors (s.6 of the CDDA 1986). Under s. 6, the minimum period of disqualification is two years, up to a maximum of 15 years;
(ii) disqualification after investigation of a company under Pt XIV of the CA 1985 (it should be noted that this part of the previous Act still sets out the procedures for company investigations) (s.8 of the CDDA 1986). Once again, the maximum period of disqualification is 15 years.
Schedule 1 to the CDDA 1986 sets out certain particulars to which the court is to have regard in deciding whether a person’s conduct as a director makes them unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. In addition, the courts have given indications as to what sort of behaviour will render a person liable to be considered unfit to act as a company director. Thus, in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd (1988), it was stated that:
‘Ordinary commercial misjudgment is in itself not sufficient to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the conduct complained of must display a lack of commercial probity, although . . . in an extreme case of gross negligence or total incompetence, disqualification could be appropriate.’

(c) Other cases for disqualification
This third category relates to:
(i) participation in fraudulent or wrongful trading under s.213 of the Insolvency Act (IA)1986 (s.10 of the CDDA 1986);
(ii) undischarged bankrupts acting as directors (s.11 of the CDDA 1986); and
(iii) failure to pay under a county court administration order (s.12 of the CDDA 1986).
For the purposes of most of the CDDA 1986, the court has discretion to make a disqualification order. Where, however, a person has been found to be an unfit director of an insolvent company, the court has a duty to make a disqualification order (s.6 of the CDDA 1986). Anyone who acts in contravention of a disqualification order is liable:
(i) to imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine, on conviction on indictment; or
(ii) to imprisonment for up to six months and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, on conviction summarily (s.13 of the CDDA 1986).

正确答案：
(ii) Consultation – it may not be possible to hold extensive consultations on specialist issues within a small firm, due to a
lack of specialist professionals. There may be a lack of suitably experienced peers to discuss issues arising on client
engagements. Arrangements with other practices for consultation may be necessary.
Training/Continuing Professional Development (CPD) – resources may not be available, and it is expensive to establish
an in-house training function. External training consortia can be used to provide training/CPD for qualified staff, and
training on non-exam related issues for non-qualified staff.
Review procedures – it may not be possible to hold an independent review of an engagement within the firm due to the
small number of senior and experienced auditors. In this case an external review service may be purchased.
Lack of specialist experience – where special skills are needed within an engagement; the skills may be bought in, for
example, by seconding staff from another practice. Alternatively if work is too specialised for the firm, the work could be
sub-contracted to another practice.
Working papers – the firm may lack resources to establish an in-house set of audit manuals or standard working papers.
In this case documentation can be provided by external firms or professional bodies.

正确答案：
(a) To: Board of directors
From: Management Accountant
Date: 8 June 2007
The potential benefits of the adoption of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement within GER are as
follows:
A broader business perspective
Financial measures invariably have an inward-looking perspective. The balanced scorecard is wider in its scope and
application. It has an external focus and looks at comparisons with competitors in order to establish what constitutes best
practice and ensures that required changes are made in order to achieve it. The use of the balanced scorecard requires a
balance of both financial and non-financial measures and goals.
A greater strategic focus
The use of the balanced scorecard focuses to a much greater extent on the longer term. There is a far greater emphasis on
strategic considerations. It attempts to identify the needs and wants of customers and the new products and markets. Hence
it requires a balance between short term and long term performance measures.
A greater focus on qualitative aspects
The use of the balanced scorecard attempts to overcome the over-emphasis of traditional measures on the quantifiable aspects
of the internal operations of an organisation expressed in purely financial terms. Its use requires a balance between
quantitative and qualitative performance measures. For example, customer satisfaction is a qualitative performance measure
which is given prominence under the balanced scorecard approach.
A greater focus on longer term performance
The use of traditional financial measures is often dominated by financial accounting requirements, for example, the need to
show fixed assets at their historic cost. Also, they are primarily focused on short-term profitability and return on capital
employed in order to gain stakeholder approval of short term financial reports, the longer term or whole life cycle often being
ignored.
The limitations of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement may be viewed as follows:
The balanced scorecard attempts to identify the chain of cause and effect relationships which will provide the stimulus for
the future success of an organisation.
Advocates of a balanced scorecard approach to performance measurement suggest that it can constitute a vital component
of the strategic management process.
However, Robert Kaplan and David Norton, the authors of the balanced scorecard concept concede that it may not be suitable
for all firms. Norton suggests that it is most suitable for firms which have a long lead time between management action and
financial benefit and that it will be less suitable for firms with a short-term focus. However, other flaws can be detected in
the balanced scorecard.
The balanced scorecard promises to outline the theory of the firm by clearly linking the driver/outcome measures in a cause
and effect chain, but this will be difficult if not impossible to achieve.
The precise cause and effect relationships between measures for each of the perspectives on the balanced scorecard will be
complex because the driver and outcome measures for the various perspectives are interlinked. For example, customer
satisfaction may be seen to be a function of several drivers, such as employee satisfaction, manufacturing cycle time and
quality. However, employee satisfaction may in turn be partially driven by customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction
may partially drive manufacturing cycle time. A consequence of this non-linearity of the cause and effect chain (i.e., there is
non-linear relationship between an individual driver and a single outcome measure), is that there must be a question mark
as to the accuracy of any calculated correlations between driver and outcome measures. Allied to this point, any calculated
correlations will be historic. This implies that it will only be possible to determine the accuracy of cause and effect linkages
after the event, which could make the use of the balanced scorecard in dynamic industries questionable. If the market is
undergoing rapid evolution, for example, how meaningful are current measures of customer satisfaction or market share?
These criticisms do not necessarily undermine the usefulness of the balanced scorecard in presenting a more comprehensive
picture of organisational performance but they do raise doubts concerning claims that a balanced scorecard can be
constructed which will outline a clear cause and effect chain between driver and outcome measures and the firm’s financial
objectives.