看看有你所在的吉林省有上榜吗——ACCA中国考点分布城市

发布时间:2020-01-08


还有两个多月的时间就又要迎来新的一季ACCA考试了。备考的ACCAer们准备的怎么样了呢?虽然现在看似时间还算充足,但除去周末和春节假日,给大家复习的时间其实已经不算太多了。因此,51题库考试学习网建议有参加3月份考试的ACCAer们现在开始可以着手准备啦!什么?你竟然不知道考试地点在哪里?不用担心,51题库考试学习网会为大家解决这个问题,快来看看离家近不近呢?由于目前20203月份的ACCA考试地点暂未公布,大家可以参考一下往年的考试地址,根据考试时间和地点提前做好相应的安排,避免考试迟到:

北京考点

I998北京广播电视大学

 海淀区大钟寺东路5号北京广播电视大学4号教学楼(北三环大钟寺古钟博物馆往北500米)

I837首都经济贸易大学红庙校区

北京朝阳门外红庙金台里24号教学楼

I866北京市教育考试指导中心

北京市安定门外外馆东街23

河北考点

I769保定

河北省保定市恒祥北大街3188号河北金融学院东门教学楼C1071051

上海考点

I987上海东北

上海开放大学(主校区),国顺路288

I997上海西南

好望角大饭店,肇嘉浜路500号;青松城大酒店,肇嘉浜路777

I844上海浦东

上海海事大学(东明路校区),东明路1336

I849松江

上海市松江区文翔路1900号上海对外贸易学院松江校区

长沙考点地址:

I900长沙考点

 湖南大众传媒职业技术学院南院,湖南省长沙市新建西路77号湖南大众传媒职业技术学院新教学楼

重庆考点

I893重庆

具体地址目前待定,届时会在您的准考证中直接显示

成都考点

I803成都市人才培训中心(成都市人事考试中心),四川省成都市中南大街56号,

I803四川大学出国留学人员培训部,四川省成都市科华北路(川大西门)

以上就是关于ACCA考试的部分考点地址,希望对你备考ACCA的你有所帮助。最后,51题库考试学习网祝福ACCAer们旗开得胜,相信自己,加油~


下面小编为大家准备了 ACCA考试 的相关考题,供大家学习参考。

This scenario summarises the development of a company called Rock Bottom through three phases, from its founding in 1965 to 2008 when it ceased trading.

Phase 1 (1965–1988)

In 1965 customers usually purchased branded electrical goods, largely produced by well-established domestic companies, from general stores that stocked a wide range of household products. However, in that year, a recent university graduate, Rick Hein, established his first shop specialising solely in the sale of electrical goods. In contrast to the general stores, Rick Hein’s shop predominantly sold imported Japanese products which were smaller, more reliable and more sophisticated than the products of domestic competitors. Rick Hein quickly established a chain of shops, staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the products they were selling. He backed this up with national advertising in the press, an innovation at the time for such a specialist shop. He branded his shops as ‘Rock Bottom’, a name which specifically referred to his cheap prices, but also alluded to the growing importance of

rock music and its influence on product sales. In 1969, 80% of sales were of music centres, turntables, amplifiers and speakers, bought by the newly affluent young. Rock Bottom began increasingly to specialise in selling audio equipment.

Hein also developed a high public profile. He dressed unconventionally and performed a number of outrageous stunts that publicised his company. He also encouraged the managers of his stores to be equally outrageous. He rewarded their individuality with high salaries, generous bonus schemes and autonomy. Many of the shops were extremely successful, making their managers (and some of their staff) relatively wealthy people.

However, by 1980 the profitability of the Rock Bottom shops began to decline significantly. Direct competitors using a similar approach had emerged, including specialist sections in the large general stores that had initially failed to react to the challenge of Rock Bottom. The buying public now expected its electrical products to be cheap and reliable.

Hein himself became less flamboyant and toned down his appearance and actions to satisfy the banks who were becoming an increasingly important source of the finance required to expand and support his chain of shops.

Phase 2 (1989–2002)

In 1988 Hein considered changing the Rock Bottom shops into a franchise, inviting managers to buy their own shops (which at this time were still profitable) and pursuing expansion though opening new shops with franchisees from outside the company. However, instead, he floated the company on the country’s stock exchange. He used some of the capital raised to expand the business. However, he also sold shares to help him throw the ‘party of a lifetime’ and to purchase expensive goods and gifts for his family. Hein became Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the newly quoted company, but over the next thirteen years his relationship with his board and shareholders became increasingly difficult. Gradually new financial controls and reporting systems were put in place. Most of the established managers left as controls became more centralised and formal. The company’s performance was solid but unspectacular. Hein complained that ‘business was not fun any more’. The company was legally required to publish directors’ salaries in its annual report and the generous salary package enjoyed by the Chairman and CEO increasingly became an issue and it dominated the 2002 Annual General Meeting (AGM). Hein was embarrassed by its publication and the discussion it led to in the national media. He felt that it was an infringement of his privacy and

civil liberties.

Phase 3 (2003–2008)

In 2003 Hein found the substantial private equity investment necessary to take Rock Bottom private again. He also used all of his personal fortune to help re-acquire the company from the shareholders. He celebrated ‘freeing Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the world to attend. However, most of the new generation of store managers found Hein’s style. to be too loose and unfocused. He became rude and angry about their lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Furthermore, changes in products and how they were purchased meant that fewer people bought conventional audio products from specialist shops. The reliability of these products now meant that they were replaced relatively infrequently. Hein, belatedly, started to consider selling via an Internet site. Turnover and profitability plummeted. In 2007 Hein again considered franchising the company,but he realised that this was unlikely to be successful. In early 2008 the company ceased trading and Hein himself,now increasingly vilified and attacked by the press, filed for personal bankruptcy.

Required:

(a) Analyse the reasons for Rock Bottom’s success or failure in each of the three phases identified in the

scenario. Evaluate how Rick Hein’s leadership style. contributed to the success or failure of each phase.

(18 marks)

(b) Rick Hein considered franchising the Rock Bottom brand at two points in its history – 1988 and 2007.

Explain the key factors that would have made franchising Rock Bottom feasible in 1988, but would have

made it ‘unlikely to be successful’ in 2007. (7 marks)

正确答案:

(a) The product life cycle model suggests that a product passes through six stages: introduction, development, growth, shakeout,
maturity and decline. The first Rock Bottom phase appears to coincide with the introduction, development and growth periods
of the products offered by the company. These highly specified, high quality products were new to the country and were
quickly adopted by a certain consumer segment (see below). The life cycle concept also applies to services, and the innovative
way in which Rock Bottom sold and marketed the products distinguished the company from potential competitors. Not only
were these competitors still selling inferior and older products but their retail methods looked outdated compared with Rock Bottom’s bright, specialist shops. Rock Bottom’s entry into the market-place also exploited two important changes in the
external environment. The first was the technological advance of the Japanese consumer electronics industry. The second
was the growing economic power of young people, who wished to spend their increasing disposable income on products that
allowed them to enjoy popular music. Early entrants into an industry gain experience of that industry sooner than others. This
may not only be translated into cost advantages but also into customer loyalty that helps them through subsequent stages of
the product’s life cycle. Rock Bottom enjoyed the advantages of a first mover in this industry.
Hein’s leadership style. appears to have been consistent with contemporary society and more than acceptable to his young
target market. As an entrepreneur, his charismatic leadership was concerned with building a vision for the organisation and
then energising people to achieve it. The latter he achieved through appointing branch managers who reflected, to some
degree, his own style. and approach. His willingness to delegate considerable responsibility to these leaders, and to reward
them well, was also relatively innovative. The shops were also staffed by young people who understood the capabilities of the
products they were selling. It was an early recognition that intangible resources of skills and knowledge were important to the
organisation.
In summary, in the first phase Rock Bottom’s organisation and Hein’s leadership style. appear to have been aligned with
contemporary society, the customer base, employees and Rock Bottom’s position in the product/service life cycle.
The second phase of the Rock Bottom story appears to reflect the shakeout and maturity phases of the product life cycle. The
entry of competitors into the market is a feature of the growth stage. However, it is in the shakeout stage that the market
becomes saturated with competitors. The Rock Bottom product and service approach is easily imitated. Hein initially reacted
to these new challenges by a growing maturity, recognising that outrageous behaviour might deter the banks from lending to
him. However, the need to raise money to fund expansion and a latent need to realise (and enjoy) his investment led to the
company being floated on the country’s stock exchange. This, eventually, created two problems.
The first was the need for the company to provide acceptable returns to shareholders. This would have been a new challenge
for Hein. He would have to not only maintain dividends to external shareholders, but he would also have to monitor and
improve the publicly quoted share price. In an attempt to establish an organisation that could deliver such value, changes
were made in the organisational structure and style. Most of the phase 1 entrepreneur-style. managers left. This may have
been inevitable anyway as Rock Bottom would have had problems continuing with such high individual reward packages in
a maturing market. However, the new public limited organisation also demanded managers who were more transactional
leaders, focusing on designing systems and controlling performance. This style. of management was alien to Rick’s approach.
The second problem was the need for the organisation to become more transparent. The publishing of Hein’s financial details
was embarrassing, particularly as his income fuelled a life-style. that was becoming less acceptable to society. What had once
appeared innovative and amusing now looked like an indulgence. The challenge now was for Hein to change his leadership
style. to suit the new situation. However, he ultimately failed to do this. Like many leaders who have risen to their position
through entrepreneurial ability and a dominant spirit, the concept of serving stakeholders rather than ordering them around
proved too difficult to grasp. The sensible thing would have been to leave Rock Bottom and start afresh. However, like many
entrepreneurs he was emotionally attached to the company and so he persuaded a group of private equity financiers to help
him buy it back. Combining the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also controversial and likely to attract
criticism concerning corporate governance.

In summary, in the second phase of Hein’s leadership he failed to change his approach to reflect changing social values, a
maturing product/service market-place and the need to serve new and important stakeholders in the organisation. He clearly
saw the public limited company as a ‘shackle’ on his ambition and its obligations an infringement of his personal privacy.
It can be argued that Hein took Rock Bottom back into private ownership just as the product life cycle moved into its decline
stage. The product life cycle is a timely reminder that any product or service has a finite life. Forty years earlier, as a young
man, Hein was in touch with the technological and social changes that created a demand for his product and service.
However, he had now lost touch with the forces shaping the external environment. Products have now moved on. Music is
increasingly delivered through downloaded files that are then played through computers (for home use) or MP3s (for portable
use). Even where consumers use traditional electronic equipment, the reliability of this equipment means that it is seldom
replaced. The delivery method, through specialised shops, which once seemed so innovative is now widely imitated and
increasingly, due to the Internet, less cost-effective. Consumers of these products are knowledgeable buyers and are only
willing to purchase, after careful cost and delivery comparisons, through the Internet. Hence, Hein is in a situation where he
faces more competition to supply products which are used and replaced less frequently, using a sales channel that is
increasingly uncompetitive. Consequently, Hein’s attempt to re-vitalise the shops by using the approach he adopted in phase
1 of the company was always doomed to failure. This failure was also guaranteed by the continued presence of the managers
appointed in phase 2 of the company. These were managers used to tight controls and targets set by centralised management.
To suddenly be let loose was not what they wanted and Hein appears to have reacted to their inability to act entrepreneurially
with anger and abuse. Hein’s final acts of reinvention concerned the return to a hedonistic, conspicuous life style. that he had
enjoyed in the early days of the company. He probably felt that this was possible now that he did not have the reporting
requirements of the public limited company. However, he had failed to recognise significant changes in society. He celebrated
the freeing of ‘Rock Bottom from its shackles’ by throwing a large celebration party. Celebrities were flown in from all over the
world to attend. It seems inevitable that the cost and carbon footprint of such an event would now attract criticism.
Finally, in summary, Hein’s approach and leadership style. in phase 3 became increasingly out of step with society’s
expectations, customers’ requirements and employees’ expectations. However, unlike phase 2, Hein was now free of the
responsibilities and controls of professional management in a public limited company. This led him to conspicuous activities
that further devalued the brand, meaning that its demise was inevitable.

(b) At the end of the first phase Hein still had managers who were entrepreneurial in their outlook. It might have been attractive
for them to become franchisees, particularly as this might be a way of protecting their income through the more challenging
stages of the product and service life cycle that lay ahead. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again (phase
3), the managers were unlikely to be of the type that would take up the challenge of running a franchise. These were
managers used to meeting targets within the context of centrally determined policies and budgets within a public limited
company. Hein would have to make these employees redundant (at significant cost) and with no certainty that he could find
franchisees to replace them.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was a strong brand, associated with youth and innovation. First movers often retain
customer loyalty even when their products and approach have been imitated by new aggressive entrants to the market. A
strong brand is essential for a successful franchise as it is a significant part of what the franchisee is buying. However, by the
time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, the brand was devalued by his behaviour and incongruent with
customer expectations and sales channels. For example, it had no Internet sales channel. If Hein had developed Rock Bottom
as a franchise it would have given him the opportunity to focus on building the brand, rather than financing the expansion
of the business through the issue of shares.
At the end of phase 1, Rock Bottom was still a financially successful company. If it had been franchised at this point, then
Hein could have realised some of his investment (through franchise fees) and used some of this to reward himself, and the
rest of the money could have been used to consolidate the brand. Much of the future financial risk would have been passed
to the franchisees. There would have been no need to take Rock Bottom public and so suffer the scrutiny associated with a
public limited company. However, by the time Hein came to look at franchising again in phase 3, most of the shops were
trading at a loss. He saw franchising as a way of disposing of the company in what he hoped was a sufficiently well-structured
way. In effect, it was to minimise losses. It seems highly unlikely that franchisees would have been attracted by investing in
something that was actually making a loss. Even if they were, it is unlikely that the franchise fees (and hence the money
immediately realised) would be very high.


2 Tyre, a public limited company, operates in the vehicle retailing sector. The company is currently preparing its financial

statements for the year ended 31 May 2006 and has asked for advice on how to deal with the following items:

(i) Tyre requires customers to pay a deposit of 20% of the purchase price when placing an order for a vehicle. If the

customer cancels the order, the deposit is not refundable and Tyre retains it. If the order cannot be fulfilled by

Tyre, the company repays the full amount of the deposit to the customer. The balance of the purchase price

becomes payable on the delivery of the vehicle when the title to the goods passes. Tyre proposes to recognise

the revenue from the deposits immediately and the balance of the purchase price when the goods are delivered

to the customer. The cost of sales for the vehicle is recognised when the balance of the purchase price is paid.

Additionally, Tyre had sold a fleet of cars to Hub and gave Hub a discount of 30% of the retail price on the

transaction. The discount given is normal for this type of transaction. Tyre has given Hub a buyback option which

entitles Hub to require Tyre to repurchase the vehicles after three years for 40% of the purchase price. The normal

economic life of the vehicles is five years and the buyback option is expected to be exercised. (8 marks)

Required:

Advise the directors of Tyre on how to treat the above items in the financial statements for the year ended

31 May 2006.

(The mark allocation is shown against each of the above items)

正确答案:
2 Advice on sundry accounting issues: year ended 31 May 2006
The following details the nature of the advice relevant to the accounting issues.
Revenue recognition
(i) Sale to customers
IAS18 ‘Revenue’ requires that revenue relating to the sale of goods is recognised when the significant risks and rewards are
transferred to the buyer. Also the company should not retain any continuing managerial involvement associated with
ownership or control of the goods. Additionally the revenue and costs must be capable of reliable measurement and it should
be probable that the economic benefits of the transaction will go to the company.
Although the deposit is non refundable on cancellation of the order by the customer, there is a valid expectation that the
deposit will be repaid where the company does not fulfil its contractual obligation in supplying the vehicle. The deposit should,
therefore, only be recognised in revenue when the vehicle has been delivered and accepted by the customer. It should be
treated as a liability up to this point. At this point also, the balance of the sale proceeds will be recognised. If the customer
does cancel the order, then the deposit would be recognised in revenue at the date of the cancellation of the order.
The appendix to IAS18, although not part of the standard, agrees that revenue is recognised when goods of this nature are
delivered to the buyer.
Sale of Fleet cars
The company has not transferred the significant risks and rewards of ownership as required by IAS18 as the buyback option
is expected to occur. The reason for this conclusion is that the company has retained the risk associated with the residual
value of the vehicles. Therefore, the transaction should not be treated as a sale. The vehicles should be treated as an operating
lease as essentially only 60% of the purchase price will be received by Tyre. Ownership of the assets are not expected to be
transferred to Hub, the lease term is arguably not for the major part of the assets’ life, and the present value of the minimum
lease payments will not be substantially equivalent to the fair value of the asset. Therefore it is an operating lease (IAS17).
No ‘outright sale profit’ will be recognised as the risks and rewards of ownership have been retained and no sale has occurred.
The vehicles will be shown in property, plant and equipment at their carrying amount. The lease income should be recognised
on a straight line basis over the lease term of three years unless some other basis is more representative. The vehicles will
be depreciated in accordance with IAS16, ‘Property, Plant and Equipment’. If there is any indication of impairment then the
company will apply IAS36 ‘Impairment of Assets’. As the discount given is normal for this type of transaction, it will not be
taken into account in estimating the fair value of the assets.
The buyback option will probably meet the definition of a financial liability and will be accounted for under IAS39 ‘Financial
Instruments: recognition and measurement’. The liability should be measured at ‘fair value’ and subsequently at amortisedcost unless designated at the outset as being at fair value through profit or loss.

(b) Show how the adjustments affect:

(i) Closing inventory;

正确答案:

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