2020年云南12月ACCA考试报名时间，速速围观！

正确答案：
(a)Roleofinternalandexternalauditors–differencesObjectivesThemainobjectiveofinternalauditistoimproveacompany’soperations,primarilyintermsofvalidatingtheefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheinternalcontrolsystemsofacompany.Themainobjectiveoftheexternalauditoristoexpressanopiniononthetruthandfairnessofthefinancialstatements,andotherjurisdictionspecificrequirementssuchasconfirmingthatthefinancialstatementscomplywiththereportingrequirementsincludedinlegislation.ReportingInternalauditreportsarenormallyaddressedtotheboardofdirectors,orotherpeoplechargedwithgovernancesuchastheauditcommittee.Thosereportsarenotpubliclyavailable,beingconfidentialbetweentheinternalauditorandtherecipient.Externalauditreportsareprovidedtotheshareholdersofacompany.Thereportisattachedtotheannualfinancialstatementsofthecompanyandisthereforepubliclyavailabletotheshareholdersandanyreaderofthefinancialstatements.ScopeofworkTheworkoftheinternalauditornormallyrelatestotheoperationsoftheorganisation,includingthetransactionprocessingsystemsandthesystemstoproducetheannualfinancialstatements.Theinternalauditormayalsoprovideotherreportstomanagement,suchasvalueformoneyauditswhichexternalauditorsrarelybecomeinvolvedwith.Theworkoftheexternalauditorrelatesonlytothefinancialstatementsoftheorganisation.However,theinternalcontrolsystemsoftheorganisationwillbetestedastheseprovideevidenceonthecompletenessandaccuracyofthefinancialstatements.RelationshipwithcompanyInmostorganisations,theinternalauditorisanemployeeoftheorganisation,whichmayhaveanimpactontheauditor’sindependence.However,insomeorganisationstheinternalauditfunctionisoutsourced.Theexternalauditorisappointedbytheshareholdersofanorganisation,providingsomedegreeofindependencefromthecompanyandmanagement.(b)BenefitsofauditcommitteeinConoyCoAssistancewithfinancialreporting(nofinanceexpertise)TheexecutivedirectorsofConoyCodonotappeartohaveanyspecificfinancialskills–asthefinancialdirectorhasrecentlyleftthecompanyandhasnotyetbeenreplaced.ThismaymeanthatfinancialreportinginConoyCoislimitedorthattheothernon-financialdirectorsspendasignificantamountoftimekeepinguptodateonfinancialreportingissues.AnauditcommitteewillassistConoyCobyprovidingspecialistknowledgeoffinancialreportingonatemporarybasis–atleastoneofthenewappointeesshouldhaverelevantandrecentfinancialreportingexperienceundercodesofcorporategovernance.ThiswillallowtheexecutivedirectorstofocusonrunningConoyCo.EnhanceinternalcontrolsystemsTheboardofConoyCodonotnecessarilyunderstandtheworkoftheinternalauditor,ortheneedforcontrolsystems.ThismeansthatinternalcontrolwithinConoyComaybeinadequateorthatemployeesmaynotrecognisetheimportanceofinternalcontrolsystemswithinanorganisation.TheauditcommitteecanraiseawarenessoftheneedforgoodinternalcontrolsystemssimplybybeingpresentinConoyCoandbyeducatingtheboardontheneedforsoundcontrols.Improvingtheinternalcontrol‘climate’willensuretheneedforinternalcontrolsisunderstoodandreducecontrolerrors.RelianceonexternalauditorsConoyCo’sinternalauditorscurrentlyreporttotheboardofConoyCo.Aspreviouslynoted,thelackoffinancialandcontrolexpertiseontheboardwillmeanthatexternalauditorreportsandadvicewillnotnecessarilybeunderstood–andtheboardmayrelytoomuchonexternalauditorsIfConoyCoreporttoanauditcommitteethiswilldecreasethedependenceoftheboardontheexternalauditors.Theauditcommitteecantaketimetounderstandtheexternalauditor’scomments,andthenviathenon-executivedirector,ensurethattheboardtakeactiononthosecomments.AppointmentofexternalauditorsAtpresent,theboardofConoyCoappointtheexternalauditors.Thisraisesissuesofindependenceastheboardmaybecometoofamiliarwiththeexternalauditorsandsoappointonthisfriendshipratherthanmerit.Ifanauditcommitteeisestablished,thenthiscommitteecanrecommendtheappointmentoftheexternalauditors.Thecommitteewillhavethetimeandexpertisetoreviewthequalityofserviceprovidedbytheexternalauditors,removingtheindependenceissue.Corporategovernancerequirements–bestpracticeConoyCodonotneedtofollowcorporategovernancerequirements(thecompanyisnotlisted).However,notfollowingthoserequirementsmaystarttohaveadverseeffectsonConoy.Forexample,ConoyCo’sbankisalreadyconcernedaboutthelackoftransparencyinreporting.EstablishinganauditcommitteewillshowthattheboardofConoyCoarecommittedtomaintainingappropriateinternalsystemsinthecompanyandprovidingthestandardofreportingexpectedbylargecompanies.Obtainingthenewbankloanshouldalsobeeasierasthebankwillbesatisfiedwithfinancialreportingstandards.Givennonon-executives–independentadvicetoboardCurrentlyConoyCodoesnothaveanynon-executivedirectors.Thismeansthatthedecisionsoftheexecutivedirectorsarenotbeingchallengedbyotherdirectorsindependentofthecompanyandwithlittleornofinancialinterestinthecompany.Theappointmentofanauditcommitteewithonenon-executivedirectorontheboardofConoyCowillstarttoprovidesomenon-executiveinputtoboardmeetings.Whilenotsufficientintermsofcorporategovernancerequirements(aboutequalnumbersofexecutiveandnon-executivedirectorsareexpected)itdoesshowtheboardofConoyCoareattemptingtoestablishappropriategovernancesystems.AdviceonriskmanagementFinally,thereareothergeneralareaswhereConoyCowouldbenefitfromanauditcommittee.Forexample,lackofcorporategovernancestructuresprobablymeansConoyCodoesnothaveariskmanagementcommittee.Theauditcommitteecanalsoprovideadviceonriskmanagement,helpingtodecreasetheriskexposureofthecompany.

正确答案：
(ii) Stakeholder claims
Four external stakeholders in the case and their claims are as follows.
The client, i.e. the government of the East Asian country. This stakeholder wants the project completed to budget and
on time. It may also be concerned to minimise negative publicity in respect of the construction of the dam and the
possible negative environmental consequences.
Stop-the-dam, the vocal and well organised pressure group. This stakeholder wants the project stopped completely,
seemingly and slightly paradoxically, for environmental and social footprint reasons.
First Nation, the indigenous people group currently resident on the land behind the dam that would be flooded after its
construction. This stakeholder also wants the project stopped so they can continue to live on and farm the land.
The banks (identified as a single group). These seem happy to lend to the project and will want it to proceed so they
make a return on their loans commensurate with the risk of the loan. They do not want to be publicly identified as being
associated with the Giant Dam Project.
Shareholders. The shareholders have the right to have their investment in the company managed in such a way as to
maximise the value of their shareholding. The shareholders seek projects providing positive NPVs within the normal
constraints of sound risk management.
Tutorial note: only four stakeholders need to be identified. Marks will be given for up to four relevant stakeholders
only.

正确答案：
(c) Ban on emptying waste water
(i) Matter
■ $0·9m provision for upgrading the process represents 45% PBT and is very material. This provision is also
material to the balance sheet (2·7% of total assets).
■ The provision for penalties is immaterial (2·2% PBT and 0·1% total assets).
■ The ban is an adjusting post balance sheet event in respect of the penalties (IAS 10). It provides evidence that at
the balance sheet date Keffler was in contravention of local government standards. Therefore it is correct (in
accordance with IAS 37) that a provision has been made for the penalties. As the matter is not material inclusion
in ‘other provisions’ is appropriate.
■ However, even if Keffler has a legal obligation to meet minimum standards, there is no obligation for upgrading the
purifying process at 31 March 2006 and the $0·9m provision should be written back.
■ If the provision for upgrading is not written back the audit opinion should be qualified ‘except for’ (disagreement).
■ Keffler does not even have a contingent liability for upgrading the process because there is no present obligation to
do so. The obligation is to stop emptying unclean water into the river. Nor is there a possible obligation whose
existence will be confirmed by an uncertain future event not wholly within Keffler’s control.
Tutorial note: Consider that Keffler has alternatives wholly within its control. For example, it could ignore the ban
and incur fines, or relocate/close this particular plant/operation or perhaps dispose of the water by alternative
means.
■ The need for a technological upgrade may be an indicator of impairment. Management should have carried out
an impairment test on the carrying value of the water purifying process and recognised any impairment loss in the
profit for the year to 31 March 2006.
■ Management’s intention to upgrade the process is more appropriate to an environmental responsibility report (if
any).
■ Whether there is any other information in documents containing financial statements.
(ii) Audit evidence
■ Penalty notices of fines received to confirm amounts and period/dates covered.
■ After-date payment of fines agreed to the cash book.
■ A copy of the ban and any supporting report on the local government’s findings.
■ Minutes of board meetings at which the ban was discussed confirming management’s intentions (e.g. to upgrade
the process).
Tutorial note: This may be disclosed in the directors’ report and/or as a non-adjusting post balance sheet event.
■ Any tenders received/costings for upgrading.
Tutorial note: This will be relevant if, for example, capital commitment authorised (by the board) but not
contracted for at the year end are disclosed in the notes to the financial statements.
■ Physical inspection of the emptying point at the river to confirm that Keffler is not still emptying waste water into
it (unless the upgrading has taken place).
Tutorial note: Thereby incurring further penalties.