ACCA考试时间在哪里修改？

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(b) Quality costs may be monitored by measuring costs of non-conformance and costs of conformance.
Costs of non-conformance occur when the product fails to reach the design quality standards. Such costs may be subdivided
into internal failure costs and external failure costs.
Internal failure costs occur when the failure is detected before the transfer of the product to the customer.
External failure costs occur when the failure to reach the required standards is not detected until after the product has been
transferred to the customer.
Costs of conformance are those incurred in reducing or eliminating the costs of non-conformance. Such costs may be
subdivided into appraisal costs and prevention costs.
Appraisal costs are those associated with the evaluation of items such as purchased material and services in order to ensure
that they conform. to the agreed specification.
Prevention costs are those associated with the implementation of a quality improvement programme. Such costs are planned
in advance and their implementation should lead to continuous improvement.
Examples of quality costs relevant to Division C may include:
Internal failure costs: cost of materials scrapped due to poor receipt and storage procedures or losses of CC output due to poor
processing routines.
External failure costs: cost of quality problems with batch of CC not detected until it has reached Division B. This may require
free replacement of the batch and compensation for loss of output by Division B.
Appraisal costs: evaluation of purchased material and services in relation to the manufacture of CC to ensure that it conforms
to the agreed specification; e.g. inspection and testing before use.
Prevention costs: the cost of implementation of staff training and the costs of equipment testing to ensure that it conforms to
the specification standards required for the production of CC.
(Alternative relevant examples would be accepted)

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(b) Directors’ retirement benefits
The directors’ retirement benefits are unfunded plans which may fall under IAS19 ‘Employee Benefits’.
Sirus should review its contractual or constructive obligation to make retirement benefit payments to its former directors at the
time when they leave the firm. The payments may create a financial liability under IAS32, or may give rise to a liability of
uncertain timing and amount which may fall within the scope of IAS37 ‘Provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent
assets’. Certain former directors are paid a fixed annuity for a fixed term which is payable annually, and on death, the present
value of future payments are paid to the director’s estate. An annuity meets the definition of a financial liability under IAS32,
if there is a contractual obligation to deliver cash or a financial asset. The latter form. of annuity falls within the scope of
IAS32/39. The present value of the annuity payments should be determined. The liability is recognised because the directors
have a contractual right to the annuity and the firm has no discretion in terms of withholding the payment. As the rights to
the annuities are earned over the period of the service of the directors, then the costs should have been recognised also over
the service period.
Where an annuity has a life contingent element and, therefore, embodies a mortality risk, it falls outside the scope of IAS39
because the annuity will meet the definition of an insurance contract which is scoped out of IAS39, along with employers’
rights and obligations under IAS19. Such annuities will, therefore, fall within the scope of IAS37 if a constructive obligation
exists. Sirus should assess the probability of the future cash outflow of the present obligation. Because there are a number of
similar obligations, IAS37 requires that the class of obligations as a whole should be considered (similar to a warranty
provision). A provision should be made for the best estimate of the costs of the annuity and this would include any liability
for post retirement payments to directors earned to date. The liability should be built up over the service period rather than
just when the director leaves. In practice the liability will be calculated on an actuarial basis consistent with the principles in
IAS19. The liability should be recalculated on an annual basis, as for any provision, to take account of changes in directors
and other factors. The liability will be discounted where the effect is material.

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The Company Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA) 1986 was introduced to control individuals who persistently abused the various privileges that accompany incorporation, most particularly the privilege of limited liability. The Act applies to more than just directors and the court may make an order preventing any person (without leave of the court) from being:
(i) a director of a company;
(ii) a liquidator or administrator of a company;
(iii) a receiver or manager of a company’s property; or
(iv) in any way, whether directly or indirectly, concerned with or taking part in the promotion, formation or management of a company.
The CDDA 1986 identifies three distinct categories of conduct, which may, and in some circumstances must, lead the court to disqualify certain persons from being involved in the management of companies.
(a) General misconduct in connection with companies
This first category involves the following:
(i) A conviction for an indictable offence in connection with the promotion, formation, management or liquidation of a company or with the receivership or management of a company’s property (s.2 of the CDDA 1986). The maximum period for disqualification under s.2 is five years where the order is made by a court of summary jurisdiction, and 15 years in any other case.

(ii) Persistent breaches of companies legislation in relation to provisions which require any return, account or other document to be filed with, or notice of any matter to be given to, the registrar (s.3 of the CDDA 1986). Section 3 provides that a person is conclusively proved to be persistently in default where it is shown that, in the five years ending with the date of the application, he has been adjudged guilty of three or more defaults (s.3(2) of the CDDA 1986). This is without prejudice to proof of persistent default in any other manner. The maximum period of disqualification under this section is five years.
(iii) Fraud in connection with winding up (s.4 of the CDDA 1986). A court may make a disqualification order if, in the course of the winding up of a company, it appears that a person:
(1) has been guilty of an offence for which he is liable under s.993 of the CA 2006, that is, that he has knowingly been a party to the carrying on of the business of the company either with the intention of defrauding the company’s creditors or any other person or for any other fraudulent purpose; or
(2) has otherwise been guilty, while an officer or liquidator of the company or receiver or manager of the property of the company, of any fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of his duty as such officer, liquidator, receiver or manager (s.4(1)(b) of the CDDA 1986).
The maximum period of disqualification under this category is 15 years.(b) Disqualification for unfitness
The second category covers:
(i) disqualification of directors of companies which have become insolvent, who are found by the court to be unfit to be directors (s.6 of the CDDA 1986). Under s. 6, the minimum period of disqualification is two years, up to a maximum of 15 years;
(ii) disqualification after investigation of a company under Pt XIV of the CA 1985 (it should be noted that this part of the previous Act still sets out the procedures for company investigations) (s.8 of the CDDA 1986). Once again, the maximum period of disqualification is 15 years.
Schedule 1 to the CDDA 1986 sets out certain particulars to which the court is to have regard in deciding whether a person’s conduct as a director makes them unfit to be concerned in the management of a company. In addition, the courts have given indications as to what sort of behaviour will render a person liable to be considered unfit to act as a company director. Thus, in Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd (1988), it was stated that:
‘Ordinary commercial misjudgment is in itself not sufficient to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the conduct complained of must display a lack of commercial probity, although . . . in an extreme case of gross negligence or total incompetence, disqualification could be appropriate.’

(c) Other cases for disqualification
This third category relates to:
(i) participation in fraudulent or wrongful trading under s.213 of the Insolvency Act (IA)1986 (s.10 of the CDDA 1986);
(ii) undischarged bankrupts acting as directors (s.11 of the CDDA 1986); and
(iii) failure to pay under a county court administration order (s.12 of the CDDA 1986).
For the purposes of most of the CDDA 1986, the court has discretion to make a disqualification order. Where, however, a person has been found to be an unfit director of an insolvent company, the court has a duty to make a disqualification order (s.6 of the CDDA 1986). Anyone who acts in contravention of a disqualification order is liable:
(i) to imprisonment for up to two years and/or a fine, on conviction on indictment; or
(ii) to imprisonment for up to six months and/or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, on conviction summarily (s.13 of the CDDA 1986).