点击查看：2020年四川省9月ACCA考试成绩查询时间

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(ii) Discussion of financial performance
It is clear that 2006 has been a difficult year for Merton plc. There are very few areas of interest to shareholders where
anything positive can be found to say.
Profitability
Return on capital employed has declined from 14·4% in 2005, which compared favourably with the sector average of
12%, to 10·2% in 2006. Since asset turnover has improved from 1·5 to 1·6 in the same period, the cause of the decline
is falling profitability. Gross profit margin has fallen each year from 27·5% in 2004 to 25% in 2006, equal to the sector
average, despite an overall increase in turnover during the period of 10% per year. Merton plc has been unable to keep
cost of sales increases (14% in 2006 and 10% in 2005) below the increases in turnover. Net profit margin has declined
over the same period from 9·7% to 6·2%, compared to the sector average of 8%, because of substantial increases in
operating expenses (15·4% in 2006 and 10·6% in 2005). There is a pressing need here for Merton plc to bring cost
of sales and operating costs under control in order to improve profitability.
Gearing and financial risk
Gearing as measured by debt/equity has fallen from 67% (2005) to 63% (2006) because of an increase in
shareholders’ funds through retained profits. Over the same period the overdraft has increased from ￡1m to ￡8m and
cash balances have fallen from ￡16m to ￡1m. This is a net movement of ￡22m. If the overdraft is included, gearing
has increased to 77% rather than falling to 63%.
None of these gearing levels compare favourably with the average gearing for the sector of 50%. If we consider the large
increase in the overdraft, financial risk has clearly increased during the period. This is also evidenced by the decline in
interest cover from 4·1 (2005) to 2·8 (2006) as operating profit has fallen and interest paid has increased. In each year
interest cover has been below the sector average of eight and the current level of 2·8 is dangerously low.
Share price
As the return required by equity investors increases with increasing financial risk, continued increases in the overdraft
will exert downward pressure on the company’s share price and further reductions may be expected.
Investor ratios
Earnings per share, dividend per share and dividend cover have all declined from 2005 to 2006. The cut in the dividend
per share from 8·5 pence per share to 7·5 pence per share is especially worrying. Although in its announcement the
company claimed that dividend growth and share price growth was expected, it could have chosen to maintain the
dividend, if it felt that the current poor performance was only temporary. By cutting the dividend it could be signalling
that it expects the poor performance to continue. Shareholders have no guarantee as to the level of future dividends.
This view could be shared by the market, which might explain why the price-earnings ratio has fallen from 14 times to
12 times.
Financing strategy
Merton plc has experienced an increase in fixed assets over the last period of ￡10m and an increase in stocks and
debtors of ￡21m. These increases have been financed by a decline in cash (￡15m), an increase in the overdraft (￡7m)
and an increase in trade credit (￡6m). The company is following an aggressive strategy of financing long-term
investment from short-term sources. This is very risky, since if the overdraft needed to be repaid, the company would
have great difficulty in raising the funds required.
A further financing issue relates to redemption of the existing debentures. The 10% debentures are due to be redeemed
in two years’ time and Merton plc will need to find ￡13m in order to do this. It does not appear that this sum can be
raised internally. While it is possible that refinancing with debt paying a lower rate of interest may be possible, the low
level of interest cover may cause concern to potential providers of debt finance, resulting in a higher rate of interest. The
Finance Director of Merton plc needs to consider the redemption problem now, as thought is currently being given to
raising a substantial amount of new equity finance. This financing choice may not be available again in the near future,
forcing the company to look to debt finance as a way of effecting redemption.
Overtrading
The evidence produced by the financial analysis above is that Merton plc is showing some symptoms of overtrading
(undercapitalisation). The board are suggesting a rights issue as a way of financing an expansion of business, but it is
possible that a rights issue will be needed to deal with the overtrading problem. This is a further financing issue requiring
consideration in addition to the redemption of debentures mentioned earlier.
Conclusion
Ordinary shareholders need to be aware of the following issues.
1. Profitability has fallen over the last year due to poor cost control
2. A substantial increase in the overdraft over the last year has caused gearing to increase

3. It is possible that the share price will continue to fall
4. The dividend cut may warn of continuing poor performance in the future
5. A total of ￡13m of debentures need redeeming in two year’s time
6. A large amount of new finance is needed for working capital and debenture redemption
Appendix: Analysis of key ratios and financial information

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(b)(i)Price/earningsratiomethodEarningspershareofNGN=80cpersharePrice/earningsratioofKFPCo=8SharepriceofNGN=80x8=640cor$6·40NumberofordinarysharesofNGN=5/0·5=10millionsharesValueofNGN=6·40x10m=$64millionHowever,itcanbearguedthatareductionintheappliedprice/earningsratioisneededasNGNisunlistedandthereforeitssharesaremoredifficulttobuyandsellthanthoseofalistedcompanysuchasKFPCo.Ifwereducetheappliedprice/earningsratioby10%(othersimilarpercentagereductionswouldbeacceptable),itbecomes7·2timesandthevalueofNGNwouldbe(80/100)x7·2x10m=$57·6million(ii)DividendgrowthmodelDividendpershareofNGN=80cx0·45=36cpershareSincethepayoutratiohasbeenmaintainedforseveralyears,recentearningsgrowthisthesameasrecentdividendgrowth,i.e.4·5%.Assumingthatthisdividendgrowthcontinuesinthefuture,thefuturedividendgrowthratewillbe4·5%.Sharepricefromdividendgrowthmodel=(36x1·045)/(0·12–0·045)=502cor$5·02ValueofNGN=5·02x10m=$50·2million(c)Adiscussionofcapitalstructurecouldstartfromrecognisingthatequityismoreexpensivethandebtbecauseoftherelativeriskofthetwosourcesoffinance.Equityisriskierthandebtandsoequityismoreexpensivethandebt.Thisdoesnotdependonthetaxefficiencyofdebt,sincewecanassumethatnotaxesexist.Wecanalsoassumethatasacompanygearsup,itreplacesequitywithdebt.Thismeansthatthecompany’scapitalbaseremainsconstantanditsweightedaveragecostofcapital(WACC)isnotaffectedbyincreasinginvestment.Thetraditionalviewofcapitalstructureassumesanon-linearrelationshipbetweenthecostofequityandfinancialrisk.Asacompanygearsup,thereisinitiallyverylittleincreaseinthecostofequityandtheWACCdecreasesbecausethecostofdebtislessthanthecostofequity.Apointisreached,however,wherethecostofequityrisesataratethatexceedsthereductioneffectofcheaperdebtandtheWACCstartstoincrease.Inthetraditionalview,therefore,aminimumWACCexistsand,asaresult,amaximumvalueofthecompanyarises.ModiglianiandMillerassumedaperfectcapitalmarketandalinearrelationshipbetweenthecostofequityandfinancialrisk.Theyarguedthat,asacompanygearedup,thecostofequityincreasedataratethatexactlycancelledoutthereductioneffectofcheaperdebt.WACCwasthereforeconstantatalllevelsofgearingandnooptimalcapitalstructure,wherethevalueofthecompanywasatamaximum,couldbefound.Itwasarguedthattheno-taxassumptionmadebyModiglianiandMillerwasunrealistic,sinceintherealworldinterestpaymentswereanallowableexpenseincalculatingtaxableprofitandsotheeffectivecostofdebtwasreducedbyitstaxefficiency.Theyrevisedtheirmodeltoincludethistaxeffectandshowedthat,asaresult,theWACCdecreasedinalinearfashionasacompanygearedup.Thevalueofthecompanyincreasedbythevalueofthe‘taxshield’andanoptimalcapitalstructurewouldresultbygearingupasmuchaspossible.Itwaspointedoutthatmarketimperfectionsassociatedwithhighlevelsofgearing,suchasbankruptcyriskandagencycosts,wouldlimittheextenttowhichacompanycouldgearup.Inpractice,therefore,itappearsthatcompaniescanreducetheirWACCbyincreasinggearing,whileavoidingthefinancialdistressthatcanariseathighlevelsofgearing.Ithasfurtherbeensuggestedthatcompanieschoosethesourceoffinancewhich,foronereasonoranother,iseasiestforthemtoaccess(peckingordertheory).Thisresultsinaninitialpreferenceforretainedearnings,followedbyapreferencefordebtbeforeturningtoequity.TheviewsuggeststhatcompaniesmaynotinpracticeseektominimisetheirWACC(andconsequentlymaximisecompanyvalueandshareholderwealth).TurningtothesuggestionthatdebtcouldbeusedtofinanceacashbidforNGN,thecurrentandpostacquisitioncapitalstructuresandtheirrelativegearinglevelsshouldbeconsidered,aswellastheamountofdebtfinancethatwouldbeneeded.Earliercalculationssuggestthatatleast$58mwouldbeneeded,ignoringanypremiumpaidtopersuadetargetcompanyshareholderstoselltheirshares.Thecurrentdebt/equityratioofKFPCois60%(15m/25m).Thedebtofthecompanywouldincreaseby$58minordertofinancethebidandbyafurther$20maftertheacquisition,duetotakingontheexistingdebtofNGN,givingatotalof$93m.Ignoringotherfactors,thegearingwouldincreaseto372%(93m/25m).KFPCowouldneedtoconsiderhowitcouldservicethisdangerouslyhighlevelofgearinganddealwiththesignificantriskofbankruptcythatitmightcreate.ItwouldalsoneedtoconsiderwhetherthebenefitsarisingfromtheacquisitionofNGNwouldcompensateforthesignificantincreaseinfinancialriskandbankruptcyriskresultingfromusingdebtfinance.

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(c) The Shirtmaster Group has decided to structure itself using two divisions who are dealing with very different markets,
customers and buying behaviours. In so doing the intention is to provide more value to the customer through a better
understanding of their needs. The existence of the two divisions also reflects the origins of the two family businesses.
Mintzberg in his work on organisation design and structure sees divisional configurations as being appropriate in relatively
simple and static environments where significant strategic power is delegated from the ‘strategic apex’ to the ‘middle line‘
general managers with responsibility for the performance of the division. Indeed one of the benefits cited for divisionalised
companies is their ability to provide a good training ground in strategic decision making for general managers who can then
progress to senior positions at company headquarters. Tony Masters’s reluctance to delegate real strategic decision making
power to the senior managers in the Shirtmaster division may be preventing those managers developing key managerial skills.
Using the Boston Box model one could classify the Shirtmaster division as a ‘dog’ with low market share in a market exhibiting
change but little growth. The Corporate Clothing division, by contrast, can be regarded as a ‘problem child’ having a small
share but of a growing market. Porter’s ‘better-off test’ needs to be met – are the two divisions better off being in the same
Group? As it stands there seems little synergy between the two divisions – there seems to be little evidence of the two divisions
sharing resources or transferring skills or learning between the two divisions. Their two value chains and systems are both
separate and different though on the face of it there are many activities that are similar. Operating independently may
encourage healthy competition between the two divisions and consequently better performance through better motivated staff.
Specialised competences such as Corporate Clothing division’s on-line response to customer orders and design changes are
more easily developed within a divisionalised structure. Performance can be clearly identified and controlled and resources
channelled to those areas showing potential. However, this may be at the expense of costly duplication of resources and an
inability to get the necessary scale to compete in either of their separate markets. Certainly, the lack of co-operation betweenthe divisions in areas such as information systems may lead to higher costs and poorer performance.

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difference will reduce in the year ending 31 May 2006 due to the projected growth in sales volumes of the Celer Transport
business. The average mail/parcels delivery of mail/parcels per vehicle of the Quicklink Ltd part of the business is budgeted
at 12,764 which is still 30·91% higher than that of the Celer Transport business.
As far as specialist activities are concerned, Quicklink Ltd is budgeted to generate average revenues per vehicle amounting to
￡374,850 whilst Celer Transport is budgeted to earn an average of ￡122,727 from each of the vehicles engaged in delivery
of processed food. It is noticeable that all contracts with major food producers were renewed on 1 June 2005 and it would
appear that there were no increases in the annual value of the contracts with major food producers. This might have been
the result of a strategic decision by the management of the combined entity in order to secure the future of this part of the
business which had been built up previously by the management of Celer Transport.
Each vehicle owned by Quicklink Ltd and Celer Transport is in use for 340 days during each year, which based on a
365 day year would give an in use % of 93%. This appears acceptable given the need for routine maintenance and repairs
due to wear and tear.
During the year ended 31 May 2005 the number of on-time deliveries of mail and parcel and industrial machinery deliveries
were 99·5% and 100% respectively. This compares with ratios of 82% and 97% in respect of mail and parcel and processed
food deliveries made by Celer Transport. In this critical area it is worth noting that Quicklink Ltd achieved their higher on-time
delivery target of 99% in respect of each activity whereas Celer Transport were unable to do so. Moreover, it is worth noting
that Celer Transport missed their target time for delivery of food products on 975 occasions throughout the year 31 May 2005
and this might well cause a high level of customer dissatisfaction and even result in lost business.
It is interesting to note that whilst the businesses operate in the same industry they have a rather different delivery mix in
terms of same day/next day demands by clients. Same day deliveries only comprise 20% of the business of Quicklink Ltd
whereas they comprise 75% of the business of Celer Transport. This may explain why the delivery performance of Celer
Transport with regard to mail and parcel deliveries was not as good as that of Quicklink Ltd.
The fact that 120 items of mail and 25 parcels were lost by the Celer Transport business is most disturbing and could prove
damaging as the safe delivery of such items is the very substance of the business and would almost certainly have resulted
in a loss of customer goodwill. This is an issue which must be addressed as a matter of urgency.
The introduction of the call management system by Quicklink Ltd on 1 June 2004 is now proving its worth with 99% of calls
answered within the target time of 20 seconds. This compares favourably with the Celer Transport business in which only
90% of a much smaller volume of calls were answered within a longer target time of 30 seconds. Future performance in this
area will improve if the call management system is applied to the Celer Transport business. In particular, it is likely that the
number of abandoned calls will be reduced and enhance the ‘image’ of the Celer Transport business.