湖北省考生进行ACCA报考的具体流程是什么样的

正确答案：
(c) Non-executive directors
Roles of NEDs
Non-executive directors have four principal roles.
The strategy role recognises that NEDs are full members of the board and thus have the right and responsibility to contribute
to the strategic success of the organisation for the benefit of shareholders. The enterprise must have a clear strategic direction
and NEDs should be able to bring considerable experience from their lives and business experience to bear on ensuring that
chosen strategies are sound. In this role they may challenge any aspect of strategy they see fit and offer advice or input to
help to develop successful strategy.
In the scrutinising or performance role, NEDs are required to hold executive colleagues to account for decisions taken and
company performance. In this respect they are required to represent the shareholders’ interests against the possibility that
agency issues arise to reduce shareholder value.
The risk role involves NEDs ensuring the company has an adequate system of internal controls and systems of risk
management in place. This is often informed by prescribed codes (such as Turnbull in the UK) but some industries, such as
chemicals, have other systems in place, some of which fall under ISO standards. In this role, NEDs should satisfy themselves
on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk management are robust and defensible.
Finally, the ‘people’ role involves NEDs overseeing a range of responsibilities with regard to the management of the executive
members of the board. This typically involves issues on appointments and remuneration, but might also involve contractual
or disciplinary issues and succession planning.
Tutorial note: these four roles are as described in the UK Higgs Report and are also contained in the Combined Code 2003.
Tensions in NED roles in the case
This refers to a potential tension in the loyalties of the NEDs. Although the NED is accountable, through the chairman to the
shareholders and thus must always act in the economic best interests of the shareholders, he or she is also a part of the board
of the company and they may, in some situations, advise discretion. Withholding information might be judged correct because
of strategic considerations or longer-term shareholder interests. In most situations, NEDs will argue for greater transparency,
less concealment and more clarity of how and why a given action will be in the interests of shareholders.
The case of mallerite overestimation places the WM NEDs in a position of some tension. Any instinct to conceal the full extent
of the overestimate of the reserve for the possible protection of the company’s short-term value must be balanced against the
duty to serve longer-term strategic interests and the public interest. Whilst concealment would protect the company’s
reputation and share price in the short term, it would be a duty of the NEDs to point out that WM should observe transparency
as far as possible in its dealing with the shareholders and other capital market participants.

正确答案：
(b) Separation of the roles of CEO and chairman
Benefits of separation of roles
The separation of the roles of chief executive and chairman was first provided for in the UK by the 1992 Cadbury provisions
although it has been included in all codes since. Most relevant to the case is the terms of the ICGN clause s.11 and OECD
VI (E) both of which provide for the separation of these roles. In the UK it is covered in the combined code section A2.
The separation of roles offers the benefit that it frees up the chief executive to fully concentrate on the management of the
organisation without the necessity to report to shareholders or otherwise become distracted from his or her executive
responsibilities. The arrangement provides a position (that of chairman) that is expected to represent shareholders’ interests
and that is the point of contact into the company for shareholders. Some codes also require the chairman to represent the
interests of other stakeholders such as employees.
Having two people rather than one at the head of a large organisation removes the risks of ‘unfettered powers’ being
concentrated in a single individual and this is an important safeguard for investors concerned with excessive secrecy or
lack of transparency and accountability. The case of Robert Maxwell is a good illustration of a single dominating
executive chairman operating unchallenged and, in so doing, acting illegally. Having the two roles separated reduces
the risk of a conflict of interest in a single person being responsible for company performance whilst also reporting on
that performance to markets. Finally, the chairman provides a conduit for the concerns of non-executive directors who,
in turn, provide an important external representation of external concerns on boards of directors.
Tutorial note: Reference to codes other than the UK is also acceptable. In all cases, detailed (clause number) knowledge
of code provisions is not required.
Accountability and separation of roles
In terms of the separation of roles assisting in the accountability to shareholders, four points can be made.
The chairman scrutinises the chief executive’s management performance on behalf of the shareholders and will be
involved in approving the design of the chief executive’s reward package. It is the responsibility of the chairman to hold
the chief executive to account on shareholders’ behalfs.
Shareholders have an identified person (chairman) to hold accountable for the performance of their investment. Whilst
day-to-day contact will normally be with the investor relations department (or its equivalent) they can ultimately hold
the chairman to account.
The presence of a separate chairman ensures that a system is in place to ensure NEDs have a person to report to outside the
executive structure. This encourages the freedom of expression of NEDs to the chairman and this, in turn, enables issues to
be raised and acted upon when necessary.
The chairman is legally accountable and, in most cases, an experienced person. He/she can be independent and more
dispassionate because he or she is not intimately involved with day-to-day management issues.

正确答案：
(b) (i) Cost of investment on acquisition of Dylan Co
Matters to consider
According to the schedule provided by the client, the cost of investment comprises three elements. One matter to
consider is whether the cost of investment is complete.
It appears that no legal or professional fees have been included in the cost of investment (unless included within the
heading ‘cash consideration’). Directly attributable costs should be included per IFRS 3 Business Combinations, and
there is a risk that these costs may be expensed in error, leading to understatement of the investment.
The cash consideration of $2·5 million is the least problematical component. The only matter to consider is whether the
cash has actually been paid. Given that Dylan Co was acquired in the last month of the financial year it is possible that
the amount had not been paid before the year end, in which case the amount should be recognised as a current liability
on the statement of financial position (balance sheet). However, this seems unlikely given that normally control of an
acquired company only passes to the acquirer on cash payment.
IFRS 3 states that the cost of investment should be recognised at fair value, which means that deferred consideration
should be discounted to present value at the date of acquisition. If the consideration payable on 31 January 2009 has
not been discounted, the cost of investment, and the corresponding liability, will be overstated. It is possible that the
impact of discounting the $1·5 million payable one year after acquisition would be immaterial to the financial
statements, in which case it would be acceptable to leave the consideration at face value within the cost of investment.
Contingent consideration should be accrued if it is probable to be paid. Here the amount is payable if revenue growth
targets are achieved over the next four years. The auditor must therefore assess the probability of the targets being
achieved, using forecasts and projections of Maxwell Co’s revenue. Such information is inherently subjective, and could
have been manipulated, if prepared by the vendor of Maxwell Co, in order to secure the deal and maximise
consideration. Here it will be crucial to be sceptical when reviewing the forecasts, and the assumptions underlying the
data. The management of Rosie Co should have reached their own opinion on the probability of paying the contingent
consideration, but they may have relied heavily on information provided at the time of the acquisition.
Audit evidence
– Agreement of the monetary value and payment dates of the consideration per the client schedule to legal
documentation signed by vendor and acquirer.
– Agreement of $2·5 million paid to Rosie Co’s bank statement and cash book prior to year end. If payment occurs
after year end confirm that a current liability is recognised on the individual company and consolidated statement
of financial position (balance sheet).
– Board minutes approving the payment.
– Recomputation of discounting calculations applied to deferred and contingent consideration.
– Agreement that the discount rate used is pre-tax, and reflects current market assessment of the time value of money
(e.g. by comparison to Rosie Co’s weighted average cost of capital).
– Revenue and profit projections for the period until January 2012, checked for arithmetic accuracy.
– A review of assumptions used in the projections, and agreement that the assumptions are comparable with the
auditor’s understanding of Dylan Co’s business.
Tutorial note: As the scenario states that Chien & Co has audited Dylan Co for several years, it is reasonable to rely on
their cumulative knowledge and understanding of the business in auditing the revenue projections.