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正确答案：
(b) ‘Opinion shopping’
Explanation of term
‘Opinion shopping’ occurs when management approach auditing firms (other than their incumbent auditors) to ask their views
on the application of accounting standards or principles to specific circumstances or transactions.
Ethical risks
The reasons for ‘opinion shopping’ may be:
■ to find alternative auditors; or
■ to get advice on a matter of contention with the incumbent auditor.
The member who is not the entity’s auditor must be alert to the possibility that their opinion – if it differs from that of the
incumbent auditor – may create undue pressure on the incumbent auditor’s judgement and so threaten the objectivity of the
audit.
Furthermore, by aligning with the interests of management when negotiating taking on an engagement, an incoming auditor
may compromise their objectivity even before the audit work commences. There is a risk that the audit fee might be seen to
be contingent upon a ‘favourable’ opinion (that is, the audit judgement coinciding with management’s preferences).
Employed professional accountants (accountants in industry) who support their company’s management in seeking second
opinions may call into question their integrity and professional behaviour.
Sufficiency of current ethical guidance
Current ethical guidance requires that when asked to provide a ‘second opinion’ a member should seek to minimise the risk
of giving inappropriate guidance, by ensuring that they have access to all relevant information.
The member should therefore:
■ ascertain why their opinion is being sought;
■ contact the auditor to provide any relevant facts;
■ with the entity’s permission, provide the auditor with a copy of their opinion.
The member’s opinion is more likely to differ if it is based on information which is different (or incomplete) as compared with
that available to the incumbent auditor. The member should therefore decline to act if permission to communicate with the
auditor is not given.
‘Opinion shopping’ might be less prevalent if company directors had no say in the appointment and remuneration of auditors.
If audit appointments were made by an independent body ‘doubtful accounting practices’ would (arguably) be less of a
negotiating factor. However, to be able to appoint auditors to multi-national/global corporations, such measures would require
the backing of regulatory bodies worldwide.
Statutory requirements in this area could also be more stringent. For example, an auditor may be required to deposit a
‘statement of circumstances’ (or a statement of ‘no circumstances’) in the event that they are removed from office or resign.
However, disclosure could be made more public if, when a change in accounting policy coincides with a change of auditors,
the financial statements and auditor’s report highlight the change and the auditors state their concurrence (or otherwise) with
the change. This could be made a statutory requirement and International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) amended to give
guidance on how auditors should report on changes.
Further, if the incoming auditor were to have a statutory right of access to the files and working papers of the outgoing auditors
they would be able to make a better and informed assessment of the desirability of the client and also appreciate the validity
(or otherwise) of any ‘statement’ issued by the outgoing auditor.

正确答案：

 

正确答案：
(c) Corporate governance provisions varying by country
There is a debate about the extent to which corporate governance provisions (in the form. of either written codes, laws or
general acceptances) should be global or whether they should vary to account for local differences. In this answer, Vincent
Viola’s view is critically evaluated.
In general terms, corporate governance provisions vary depending on such factors as local business culture, businesses’
capital structures, the extent of development of capital funding of businesses and the openness of stock markets. In Germany,
for example, companies have traditionally drawn much of their funding from banks thereby reducing their dependence on
shareholders’ equity. Stock markets in the Soviet Union are less open and less liquid than those in the West. In many
developing countries, business activity is concentrated among family-owned enterprises.
Against Vincent’s view
Although business cultures vary around the world, all business financed by private capital have private shareholders. Any
dilution of the robustness of provisions may ignore the needs of local investors to have their interests adequately represented.
This dilution, in turn, may allow bad practice, when present, to exist and proliferate.
Some countries suffer from a poor reputation in terms of endemic corruption and fraud and any reduction in the rigour with
which corporate governance provisions are implemented fail to address these shortcomings, notwithstanding the fact that they
might be culturally unexpected or difficult to implement.
In terms of the effects of macroeconomic systems, Vincent’s views ignore the need for sound governance systems to underpin
confidence in economic systems. This is especially important when inward investment needs are considered as the economic
wealth of affected countries are partly underpinned by the robustness, or not, of their corporate governance systems.
Supporting Vincent’s view
In favour of Vincent’s view are a number of arguments. Where local economies are driven more by small family businesses
and less by public companies, accountability relationships are quite different (perhaps the ‘family reasons’ referred to in the
case) and require a different type of accounting and governance.
There is a high compliance and monitoring cost to highly structured governance regimes that some developing countries may
deem unnecessary to incur.
There is, to some extent, a link between the stage of economic development and the adoption of formal governance codes.
It is generally accepted that developing countries need not necessarily observe the same levels of formality in governance as
more mature, developed economies.
Some countries’ governments may feel that they can use the laxity of their corporate governance regimes as a source of
international comparative advantage. In a ‘race to the bottom’, some international companies seeking to minimise the effects
of structured governance regimes on some parts of their operations may seek countries with less tight structures for some
operations.