陕西省考生：ACCA考试成绩有效期是多久？

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(c) Alasdair is not employed, nor is he a director, of Glaikit Limited. As he holds 25% of the shares in Glaikit Limited, he is a
participator in a close company and therefore the special close company provisions will apply. Thus Alsadair will be taxed
under the ‘loans to participator’ rules.
When the loan is written off, the amount waived will be treated as a gross distribution of ￡16,667 (￡15,000 x 10/9). This
will be assessed in the tax year in which the loan is written off (expected to be 2006/07 or 2007/08). To the extent that this
additional income makes Alasdair a higher rate taxpayer in that year, he will have to pay additional income tax of 32·5% of
the gross amount, less the available 10% tax credit.
From the company’s perspective, Glaikit Limited will have to pay 25% of the net value of any loan made to Alasdair which
has not been repaid to the company (or written off) within nine months of the year end. As the loan will remain outstanding
as at 31 March 2006, Glaikit Limited will have to pay ￡3,750 (25% x ￡15,000) to the Revenue by 1 January 2007. This
amount will not be repaid until the loan is repaid or written off. This usually takes place nine months after the year end in
which the loan is written off, so Glaikit Limited should ensure that any write-off occurs prior to 31 March 2007, or else the
repayment may be delayed for up to one year.
As the loan is tax free, the Revenue may also seek to tax Alasdair under the beneficial loan rules. If the Revenue were to seek
an assessment in this manner, the value of the benefit would be calculated and taxed as a deemed distribution. However, as
Alasdair has no connection with the company other than as an investor, it is unlikely that the beneficial loan benefit will lead
to such a deemed distribution.

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The essential issues to be disentangled from the problem scenario relate to breach of contract and the remedies available for such breach.
There seems to be no doubt that there is a contractual agreement between Arti and Bee Ltd. Normally breach of a contract occurs where one of the parties to the agreement fails to comply, either completely or satisfactorily, with their obligations under it. However, such a definition does not appear to apply in this case as the time has not yet come when Arti has to produce the text. He has merely indicated that he has no intention of doing so. This is an example of the operation of the doctrine of anticipatory breach.
This arises precisely where one party, prior to the actual due date of performance, demonstrates an intention not to perform. their contractual obligations. The intention not to fulfil the contract can be either express or implied.
Express anticipatory breach occurs where a party actually states that they will not perform. their contractual obligations (Hochster v De La Tour (1853)). Implied anticipatory breach occurs where a party carries out some act which makes performance impossible
Omnium Enterprises v Sutherland (1919)).
When anticipatory breach takes place the innocent party can sue for damages immediately on receipt of the notification of the other party’s intention to repudiate the contract, without waiting for the actual contractual date of performance as in Hochster v De La Tour. Alternatively, they can wait until the actual time for performance before taking action. In the latter instance, they are entitled to make preparations for performance, and claim the agreed contract price (White and Carter (Councils) v McGregor (1961)).
It would appear that Arti’s action is clearly an instance of express anticipatory breach and that Bee Ltd has the right either to accept the repudiation immediately or affirm the contract and take action against Arti at the time for performance (Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd (1996)). In any event Arti is bound to complete his contractual promise or suffer the consequences of his breach of contract.
Remedies for breach of contract

(i) Specific performance It will sometimes suit a party to break their contractual obligations, even if they have to pay damages. In such circumstances the court can make an order for specific performance to require the party in breach to complete their part of the contract. However, as specific performance is not available in respect of contracts of employment or personal service Arti cannot be legally required to write the book for Bee Ltd (Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association (1893)). This means that the only remedy against Arti lies in the award of damages.
(ii) Damages A breach of contract will result in the innocent party being able to sue for damages.
Bee Ltd, therefore, can sue Bob for damages, but the important issue relates to the extent of such damages.
The estimation of what damages are to be paid by a party in breach of contract can be divided into two parts: remoteness and measure.
Remoteness of damage
The rule in Hadley v Baxendale (1845) states that damages will only be awarded in respect of losses which arise naturally, or which both parties may reasonably be supposed to have contemplated when the contract was made, as a probable result of its breach.

The effect of the first part of the rule in Hadley v Baxendale is that the party in breach is deemed to expect the normal consequences of the breach, whether they actually expected them or not. Under the second part of the rule, however, the party in breach can only be held liable for abnormal consequences where they have actual knowledge that the abnormal consequences might follow (Victoria Laundry Ltd v Newham Industries Ltd (1949)).

Measure of damages
Damages in contract are intended to compensate an injured party for any financial loss sustained as a consequence of another party’s breach. The object is not to punish the party in breach, so the amount of damages awarded can never be greater than the actual loss suffered. The aim is to put the injured party in the same position they would have been in had the contract been properly performed. In order to achieve this end the claimant is placed under a duty to mitigate losses. This means that the injured party has to take all reasonable steps to minimise their loss (Payzu v Saunders (1919)). Although such a duty did not appear to apply in relation to anticipatory breach as decided in White and Carter (Councils) v McGregor (1961)(above).
Applying these rules to the fact situation in the problem it is evident that as Arti has effected an anticipatory breach of his contract with Bee Ltd he will be liable to them for damages suffered as a consequence, if indeed they suffer damage as a result of his breach. As Bee Ltd will be under a duty to mitigate their losses, they will have to commit their best endeavours to find someone else to produce the required text on time. If they can do so at no further cost then they would suffer no loss, but any additional costs in producing the text will have to be borne by Arti.
However, if Bee Ltd is unable to produce the required text on time the situation becomes more complicated.
(i) As regards the profits from the contract to supply the accountancy body with all its text, the issue would be as to whether this was normal profit or amounted to an unexpected gain, as it was not part of Bee Ltd’s normal market when the contract was signed. If Victoria Laundry Ltd v Newham Industries Ltd were to be applied it is unlikely that Bee Ltd would be able to claim that loss of profit from Arti. However, it is equally plausible that the contract was an ordinary commercial one and that Arti would have to recompense Bee Ltd for any losses suffered from its failure to complete contractual performance.
(ii) As for the extensive preliminary expenses Arti would certainly be liable for them, as long as they were in the ordinary course of Bee Ltd’s business and were not excessive (Anglia Television v Reed (1972)).